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Abstract 
This essay introduces the legal dimensions of the Anthropocene, i.e. the 
currently advocated new geological epoch in which humans are the defining 
force. It explores in this context two basic propositions. First, law as a 
technology of social organisation has been neglected in the otherwise highly 
technology-focused accounts by natural and social scientists of the drivers of 
the Anthropocene. Secondly, in those rare instances where law has been 
discussed, there is a tendency to assume that the role of law is to tackle the 
negative externalities of transactions (e.g. their environmental or social 
implications) rather than the core of the underlying transactions, i.e. the 
organisation of production and consumption processes. Such focus on 
externalities fails to unveil the role of law in prompting, sustaining and 
potentially managing the processes that have led to the Anthropocene. The 
essay provides an extensive survey of the relevant literature from a range of 
disciplines. After a brief introduction to the Anthropocene narrative and the 
possible role of law in it, it focuses on three main questions identified in 
humanities, social and natural sciences, and then discusses their legal 
dimensions: the disconnection between natural and human history, the 
profound inequalities within the human variable driving the Anthropocene, 
and the technological transition required to reach a sustainable societal 
organisation. The essay concludes with a concise research agenda linking 
specific legal questions to the broader questions raised by the advent of the 
Anthropocene. 
  
Keywords: Anthropocene, ontological dualism, climate change, planetary 
boundaries, energy transitions, inequality, human agency, environmental 
law, environmental externalities, law as a technology, positivism, future 
generations 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
‘Tout ce qui est avouable est comme destitué de tout avenir’ 
Paul Valéry, Notes sur la grandeur et la décadence de l’Europe (1927) 
 
 
To a reader’s eyes, the drafting of ‘research agendas’ may leave the 
impression of a lazy exercise. After all, an agenda is at best a pure starting-
point, with no apparent research actually conducted and no conclusions 
reached. From a drafter’s perspective, the experience of developing a 
research agenda or, more accurately, of framing a research problem can be 
a frustrating one. The considerable amount of work done upstream may not 
be fully reflected in the two modest results the exercise can hope to reach, 
namely (a) the identification of relevant research questions (including (i) not 
just potentially interesting questions, but foundational ones capable of 
federating other more specific questions, and (ii) for which legal analysis is 
particularly appropriate), and (b) the development of an overall analytical 
framework (capable (i) of organising the different questions into a meaningful 
order and (ii) of linking such questions to problems arising in broader and 
integrative natural/social science research agendas).  
This essay aims to provide a research agenda to understand the role of 
law, broadly understood as a social and cultural practice reflected in 
institutions and texts, in prompting, sustaining and potentially managing the 
Anthropocene, the proposed new epoch of the Earth system (Geological 
Time Scale) where humans are the defining geological force. More 
fundamentally, the essay aims to frame the vast inquiry on the role of law in 
the Anthropocene that we, as lawyers, will face in the XXI century and 
explain why such an inquiry must go far beyond the narrow confines of 
environmental law and encompass the entirety of law and legal processes, 
with particular emphasis on some areas where law seems to have favoured 
and sustained the advent of the Anthropocene. My goal is to advance and 
explore two basic propositions. First, law as a technology of social 
organisation has been neglected in the otherwise highly technology-focused 
accounts by natural and social scientists of the drivers of the Anthropocene. 
Secondly, in those rare instances where law has been discussed in these and 
other accounts, there is a tendency to assume that the role of law is to tackle 
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the negative externalities of transactions (e.g. their environmental or social 
implications) rather than the core of the underlying transactions (i.e. the 
organisation of production and consumption processes). Such focus on 
externalities fails, in my view, to unveil the role of law in prompting, 
sustaining and potentially managing the processes that have led to the 
Anthropocene. 
It is indeed impossible to account for the development of the forces leading 
to the Anthropocene without a sufficient understanding of the legal 
dimensions at play, including the role of sovereignty (without which climate 
mitigation would not have presented a collective action problem), the 
emergence of the corporate form (which has made possible a sufficient 
accumulation of capital), the extension of property rights (encompassing, 
among others, rights over intellectual creations, such as technology), the 
organisation of labour relations (which has varied extensively from slavery 
and forced-labour to the labour rights recognised today) or that of 
international trade (from closed imperial systems to highly liberalised 
exchanges), among many others. I specifically selected these areas as 
examples in order to emphasise how partial a focus on laws addressing 
negative externalities (whether social or environmental) would be. Accepting 
or, more accurately, uncritically or deliberately assuming that law’s role is 
merely to address the impact of certain transactions on third parties or on 
the natural environment amounts to assuming – uncritically or deliberately 
– that the very transactions causing these effects are desirable and should be 
allowed to continue. That may or may not be the case at a specific level, but 
it should result from a conscious, informed and legitimate decision. This is 
because there are legal means that could address not just the externality but 
the very nature of the transaction (e.g. banning slavery or certain industrial 
practices) or to prompt a transition away from certain transactions (e.g. 
phasing out certain chemicals or incentivising certain forms of energy 
production).  
The two propositions formulated above are the conceptual thread that 
underpins the exploratory analysis conducted in this essay of what I see as 
the main three areas of inquiry that we, as lawyers and more broadly as 
intellectuals, should engage with to clarify the role of law in the 
Anthropocene. My exploration of each area is mostly intended to suggest a 
research agenda where legal analysis is integrated within the wider research 
agenda that the Anthropocene narrative, i.e. the emerging discourse about 
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the Anthropocene as a new epoch, opens to humanities, social and natural 
sciences. After recalling the origins and implications of the Anthropocene 
narrative and elaborating on the role that law plays in it (chapter 1), I identify 
three clusters of foundational legal questions raised by this narrative, each 
arising from broader areas of inquiry in the humanities, social and natural 
sciences: the disconnection between human and natural history (chapter 2); 
the profound inequalities implied in the concept of Anthropocene (chapter 
3); and the trade-offs entailed by sustainability transitions (chapter 4). The 
final section provides a concise statement of the research agenda proposed in 
this essay (A research agenda), followed by a select bibliography.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
LAW IN THE ANTHROPOCENE NARRATIVE 
 
 
 
 
The advent of the Anthropocene is not a mere topic among others. It does 
stand apart for at least two reasons.  
First, despite its many interpretations and uses, the term ‘Anthropocene’ 
has a common core, namely that humans have become an Earth-shaping 
force of geological proportions or, more specifically, that they have caused a 
lasting change in the Earth system.1 The ‘markers’ of the Anthropocene are 																																																								
1  The introduction of the concept of Anthropocene in its present understanding was initially made 
in P. J. Crutzen, E. Stoermer, ‘The « Anthropocene »’ (2000) 41 IGBP Global Change Newsletter 17, 
and then more assertively in P. J. Crutzen, ‘Geology of Mankind’ (2002) 415 Nature 23. The 
argument was generalised in a number of publications, particularly W. Steffen, P. J. Crutzen, J. R. 
McNeil, ‘The Anthropocene: Are humans now overwhelming the great forces of nature?’ (2007) 
36/8 Ambio 614 (expressing the narrative of the Anthropocene since its origins in the 1800s, to the 
‘Great Acceleration’ after 1945, to nowadays, using as marker the concentration of carbon dioxide 
in the troposphere); W. Steffen, J. Grinevald, P. J. Crutzen, J. R. McNeill, ‘The Anthropocene: 
Conceptual and historical perspectives’ (2011) 369/1938 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 
842 (making a more general statement of Anthropocene narrative and arguing that it must be 
recognised stratigraphically as the new geological era in which we live since 1800, replacing the 
Holocene). It has been extended in a number of ways, e.g. through the definition of planetary 
boundaries or by the contribution of other disciplines to identify markers: J. Rockstrom et al, ‘A 
safe operating space for humanity’ (2009) 461 Nature 472 (a more action oriented assessment 
introducing the idea of planetary boundaries – Earth’s biophysical thresholds - within which 
human action must remain and arguing that three – carbon dioxide atmospheric concentrations, 
biodiversity loss, nitrogen releases – out of nine such boundaries have already been crossed); L. 
Robin, W. Steffen, ‘History for the Anthropocene’ (2007) 5/5 History Compass 1694 (exploring the 
implications of the concept of Anthropocene for the writing of integrated ‘world’ and 
‘environmental’ historiography); E. C. Ellis, ‘Anthropogenic transformation of the terrestrial 
biosphere’ (2011) 369/1938 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 1010 (arguing that only in 
the last century has the human transformation of the terrestrial biosphere in to anthropogenic 
biomes become sufficient to leave an irreversible and unambiguous geological record). There has 
been significant debate as to when should the Anthropocene be considered to have started: S. L. 
Lewis, M. A. Maslin, ‘Defining the Anthropocene’ (2015) 519 Nature 171; J. Zalasiewicz et al, 
‘When did the Anthropocene begin? A mid-twentieth century boundary level is stratigraphically 
optimal’ (2015) 383 Quaternary international 196; Colin N. Waters et al (2016) “The Anthropocene is 
functionally and stratigraphically distinct from the Holocene’ (2016) 351/6269 Science aad2622-1. 
One important critique of the Anthropocene narrative concerns the role of inequality: A. Malm, 
A. Hornborg, ‘The geology of mankind ? A critique of the Anthropocene narrative’ (2014) 1/1 The 
Anthropocene Review 62 (arguing that using the human species as an analytical category in the 
Anthropocene narrative obscures the fact that the fossil economy was not created nor is it upheld 
by humankind in general, but only by part of it. Inequalities must therefore be integrated in our 
understanding of the ecological crisis). There is now a significant body of literature on the 
Anthropocene. In addition to two specific journals (Anthropocene and The Anthropocene Review), several 
books have been published, including: C. Lorius, L. Carpentier, Voyage dans l’Anthropocène: cette 
nouvelle ère dont nous sommes les héros (Arles: Actes Sud, 2010); B. Glaser, G. Krause, B. M. W. Ratter, 
M. Welp (eds.), Human-Nature Interactions in the Anthropocene (London: Routledge, 2012); M. 
Whitehead, Environmental Transformations: A Geography of the Anthropocene (New York: Routledge, 
J. E. Viñuales  In Our Hands? 
_________________________________________________________________________________	
	 8 
of different natures. In addition to the concentration of greenhouse gases in 
the troposphere causing climatic change,2 the appalling rate of biodiversity 
loss,3 the level of ocean acidification,4 the radical alteration of the nitrogen5 
and phosphorous cycles 6  with the resulting eutrophication and hypoxia 
(asphyxiation) for aquatic life, 7  and other geochemical markers, 8  the 
Anthropocene can be read through ‘human markers’.  
The latter expression is complex. It is meant to go beyond the geophysical 
and geochemical markers left by humans on the Earth system and capture 
two other – subtler – types of markers, namely the impact of human activities 
on the characteristics of the human species (itself a part of the Earth system 
or, in other terms, of the biosphere) and the consolidated human practices 
that have enabled the other markers to emerge and spread. Some examples 
of the first type of human markers include changes in the chemical 
composition of human bodies9 or the total amount and global distribution of 
																																																								
2014); C. Hamilton, F. Gemenne, C. Bonneil (eds.), The Anthropocene and the Global Environmental 
Crisis: Rethinking Modernity in a New Epoch (London: Routledge, 2015). For two recent overviews of 
the literature see E. Brondizio et al., ‘Re-conceptualizing the Anthropocene: A call for 
collaboration’ (2016) Global Environmental Change, advance version: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2016.02.006; and the illuminating book-length study of 
C. Bonneuil, J.-B. Fressoz, L’événement Anthropocène. La Terre, l’histoire et nous (Paris: Seuil, 2016). 
2  Steffen, Crutzen, McNeil (2007), above n. 1. 
3  See Rockstrom et al (2009), above n. 1; S. L. Pimm et al, ‘The biodiversity of species and their 
rates of extinction, distribution, and protection’ (2014) 344/6187 Science 987 (arguing that current 
rates of extinction are about 1000 times the likely background rate of extinction). 
4  See S. Barker, A. Ridgwell, ‘Ocean Acidification’ (2012) 3/10 Nature Education Knowledge 21 
(explaining ocean acidification and human impact on it) ; J. C. Orr et al, ‘Anthropogenic ocean 
acidification over the twenty-first century and its impact on calcifying organisms’ (2005) 437 Nature 
681 (explaining trends in emissions and their consequences for ocean pH and certain marine 
organisms). 
5  See Rockstrom et al (2009), above n. 1; J. N. Galloway et al, ‘Transformation of the nitrogen cycle: 
recent trends, questions, and potential solutions’ (2008) 320/5879 Science 889 (describing human 
alterations of the nitrogen cycle as a result of combustion of fossil fuels and demand for nitrogen 
in agriculture and industry. Noting also nitrogen deficiencies in food-production in some parts of 
the world). 
6  See Rockstrom et al (2009), above n. 1; E. M. Bennet, S. R. Carpenter, N. F. Caraco, ‘Human 
Impact on Erodable Phosphorus and Eutrophication: A Global Perspective’ (2001) 51/3 BioScience 
227 (offering an estimation of the increase in net phosphorous storage in terrestrial and freshwater 
ecosystems which is 75% higher than in pre-industrial times). 
7   See R. J. Diaz, R. Rosenberg, ‘Spreading dead zones and consequences for marine ecosystems’ 
(2008) 321/5891 Science 926 (charting the expansion of ‘dead zones’ due to eutrophication and the 
resulting hypoxia). 
8  See Waters et al (2016), above n. 1 (reviewing evidence for a variety of geochemical signatures of 
human action or ‘technofossils’) 
9  See D. Smith, ‘Worldwide trends in DDT levels in human breast milk’ (1999) 28 International Journal 
of Epidemiology 179 (tracking contamination of human breast milk by the persistent organic pollutant 
DDT) ; QQ Li et al, ‘Persistent organic pollutants and adverse health effects in humans’ (2006) 
69/21 Journal of Toxicology and Environmental Health/A 1987 (review article on the state of knowledge 
on residual levels of persistent organic pollutant concentrations in human adipose tissue worldwide, 
before moving to the case of Singapore). 
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human biomass.10 Some examples of the second type of human markers 
include the consolidated social practices that are usually referred to with the 
terms ‘technology’ (e.g. energy production and transportation based on fossil 
fuels, agricultural production based on agrochemicals, warfare equipment 
and technology), ‘institutions’ (e.g. forms of social organisation, capitalistic 
production and exchange processes, urbanisation, legal systems) or ‘culture’ 
(e.g. consumerism, certain religious and cultural views of the world). Such 
social practices share the underlying trait that they have enabled (i.e. they 
have likely played a role, although not necessarily a causal role) humans to 
turn into a geological force. Understanding these consolidated social 
practices as human markers makes law, whether it is considered as a 
technology, an institution, a form of culture, a combination of these things or 
another consolidated social practice, a possible human marker of the 
Anthropocene, alongside the other markers. 
Unsurprisingly, whereas the existence of a link between, on the one hand, 
these human activities combined and, on the other hand, the profound 
impacts on the Earth system is less and less controversial, the specific 
interrelations between different phenomena are becoming more and more 
so. To give a sense of how much the debate is shifting towards the 
controversial specificities, it will suffice to recall some of the main questions 
asked: is the overexploitation of resources that characterises the 
Anthropocene a result of capitalism? Who has benefitted and who has not? 
Is there a debt towards the latter or towards future generations? Has the 
unprecedented development of military capacity led to the Anthropocene? 
Has science, with the opening of new frontiers and possibilities, resulted in 
the Anthropocene? Have religious beliefs – placing humans as ‘masters’ of 
the ‘creation’ – or cultural beliefs – modernity and ‘progress’ – led to the 
Anthropocene? None of these questions can be fully and definitively 
answered, but each one can be illuminated to an extent sufficient to enable 
understanding and perhaps meaningful change in the relevant human facts. 
This leads me to the second reason why the Anthropocene is not a mere 
topic among others, namely that the advent of the Anthropocene raises all 
these questions at once. It calls upon all disciplines, the entire body of human 																																																								
10  See S. Walpole et al, ‘The weight of nations: An estimation of adult human biomass’ (2012) 12/439 
BMC Public Health, available at http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/12/439 (according to 
whom, in 2005, global adult human biomass was approximately 287 million tonnes, of which 15 
million tonnes were due to overweight, a mass equivalent to that of 242 million people of average 
body mass. North America has 6% of the world population but 34% of biomass due to obesity. 
Asia has 61% of the world population but 13% of biomass due to obesity). 
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knowledge about the world, to analyse what is happening and how to face it. 
As noted in a 2016 review article covering a good part of the emerging 
literature on the Anthropocene ‘[f]ew global change science concepts have 
enjoyed such a broad and rapid uptake in technical and public discourses 
despite a long history of scholarship exploring human interactions with the 
global environment’.11  This is true of natural sciences but also of social 
sciences and humanities.12 However, it is not true of law and lawyers, not yet. 
The above review article does not even mention legal disciplines as part of 
the integrative approach, and legal aspects are also neglected or, at best, only 
mentioned in passing in other major efforts to extend the conversation 
beyond natural sciences.13 This is not surprising because law and legal studies 
have been considered – and institutionally organised – as a separate subject 
for centuries. Lawyers are partly responsible. We spend far too much time 
speaking to each other, and our conceptions of interdisciplinarity have 
remained fairly simplistic. 
In the last few years, however, the Anthropocene theme has started, albeit 
timidly, to permeate legal studies. So far, there have been three main sets of 
contributions from lawyers to the role of law in the Anthropocene, including 
two books,14 one issue of a major legal journal,15 and a small number of 
articles.16 The great majority come from environmental lawyers, and they 																																																								
11  Brondizio et al (2016), above n. 1, at 2. 
12  See G. Palsson et al, ‘Reconceptualizing the ‘Anthropos’ in the Anthropocene: integrating the 
social sciences and humanities in global environmental change research’ (2013) 28 Environmental 
Science and Policy 1 (overlooking law in its attempt to integrate social sciences and humanities); N. 
Castree et al, ‘Changing the intellectual climate’ (2014) 4 Nature Climate Change 763 (mentioning, as 
part of the ‘missing human dimensions’, the need to integrate environmental lawyers, but without 
any further development). 
13  See Palsson et al (2013), above n. 12; Castree et al (2014), above n. 12; N. Castree, ‘The 
Anthropocene and the Environmental Humanities: Extending the Conversation’ (2014) 5 
Environmental Humanities 233 (mentioning environmental lawyers as those to whom the conversation 
should be extended, but without any further discussion). 
14  See A. S. Garmestani, C. R. Allen (eds.), Social–Ecological Resilience and Law (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2014) (focusing on the need for adaptive law making to face the challenges of the 
Anthropocene); L. Kotzè, Global Environmental Constitutionalism in the Anthropocene (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2016) (arguing for a reconceptualization of environmental constitutionalism to face the 
challenges of the Anthropocene and for its generalisation at the international level). 
15  See Yearbook of International Environmental Law (2014) 25 (1) (including four articles specifically 
focusing on the Anthropocene concept and its relevance for international law – Vidas, Zalasiewicz, 
Williams - , its constitutional potential – Kotzè - , the role of ecological integrity within 
international environmental law – Bridgewater, Kim, Bosselmann - , and the impact of the 
Anthropocene concept on the doctrine on international environmental law – Vordermayer) 
16  The authors of these articles are recurrent and their different contributions tend to expand on their 
earlier arguments. See e.g. Nicholas Robinson: ‘Beyond Sustainability: Environmental 
Management for the Anthropocene Epoch’ (2012) 12 Journal of Public Affairs 181 (arguing that 
sustainable development is insufficient to rise to the challenges of the Anthropocene and that resort 
to two fundamental principles, cooperation and resilience, is necessary); ‘Fundamental Principles 
of Law for the Anthropocene ?’ (2014) 44 Environmental Policy and Law 1 (identifying ways of legally 
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have mostly appeared in environmentally-minded platforms. This is 
understandable but problematic. Environmental law, whether at the 
domestic or at the international level, has been built upon the idea that its 
purpose and raison d’être is to tackle the adverse effects of transactions on 
those who do not take part to them, whether third parties or the environment 
(negative externalities). The initial Pigouvian idea of correcting this market 
dysfunction through policy intervention (a tax),17 further developed by R. 
Coase in the 1960s (with a focus on trading),18 was already at play in the early 
1800s, roughly a century before its formal conceptualisation in economic 
theory. The early examples of environmental laws concerned the nuisance 
arising from industrial activities and their target, as I shall discuss later, was 
not to block the activity but to address the effects through compensation or 
the application of a regulatory system (involving authorisation, relocation 
and inspection). Despite the great sophistication of contemporary 
environmental law systems,19 there has been little change in its overall focus. 																																																								
enhancing the concept of sustainability – through environmental rights and several principles such 
as cooperation, nature stewardship, resilience, foresight, sufficiency, well-being, and justice - in 
order to manage the environmental challenges of the Anthropocene); Eric Biber, ‘Law in the 
Anthropocene Epoch’ (2016) UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 2834037 (2 September 2016) 
(exploring the implications of the stress placed by the Anthropocene on certain concepts of private 
and public American law) ; Louis Kotzé: ‘Rethinking Global Environmental Law and Governance 
in the Anthropocene’ (2014) 32 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 121 (attempting to 
mainstream the Anthropocene concept within environmental law discourse); ‘Human Rights and 
the Environment in the Anthropocene’ (2014) 1 The Anthropocene Review 1 (arguing that the role of 
human rights in connection with environmental protection must be fundamentally redefined to 
take into account the Anthropocene); Klaus Bosselmann: K. Rakhyun and K. Bosselmann, 
‘International Environmental Law in the Anthropocene : Towards a Purposive System of 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ (2013) 2 Transnational Environmental Law 285 (arguing that 
in order for multilateral environmental agreements to become effective they should all be 
considered to target a single goal, namely the integrity of Earth’s life-support system. This idea is 
further developed in a subsequent co-authored article in the Yearbook of International 
Environmental Law); Davor Vidas: D. Vidas, O. K. Fauchald, Ø. Jensen, M. W. Tvedt, 
‘International law for the Anthropocene ? Shifting perspectives in regulation of the oceans, 
environment and genetic resources’ (2015) 9 Anthropocene 1 (discussing the implications of the 
Anthropocene for two assumptions underpinning international law, namely the quest for stability 
in international relations and the assumption of stability in the natural substrate). Professor Vidas 
has been very active in integrating the Anthropocene concept into international legal scholarship, 
and he has participated in a variety of non-legal publications as well. Finally, two other articles use 
the term Anthropocene but, in fairness, it is more accurate to place them among the literature on 
climate change law: K. N. Scott, ‘International law in the Anthropocene: Responding to the 
Geoengineering Challenge’ (2012) 34 Michigan Journal of International Law 309 (referring to the 
Anthropocene as the background of geoengineering but only identifying some well-known 
principles of international environmental law as applicable to the governance of geoengineering); 
S. H. Baker, ‘Adaptive Law in the Anthropocene’ (2015) 90 Chicago-Kent Law Review 563 (focusing 
on the inadequacy of current strategies to adaptation to climate change and arguing for adaptive 
legal principles). 
17  See A. C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (London : Mcmillan, 1920). 
18  See R. Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1.  
19  On domestic environmental law systems see E. Lees, J. E. Vinuales (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2018). On international 
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This is particularly so with the increasing influence of market-based 
approaches to environmental protection, 20  which emphasise the 
internalisation of negative externalities, even for externalities that exceed the 
threshold of significant or even serious damage.21 What better example of a 
monstrous ‘externality’ than the Anthropocene itself? We need to go beyond 
addressing externalities and concentrate on addressing the transactions 
themselves. In other words, we need to go beyond ‘environmental’ law, in its 
present understanding as the law tackling negative externalities, and focus on 
how law more generally organises the transactions or processes that 
prompted the Anthropocene. 
This wider focus is by no means foreign to the Anthropocene narrative; 
quite to the contrary. In the founding modern narrative of the Anthropocene, 
P. Crutzen situates its origins in the late eighteen century and links this date 
to the granting, in 1784, of an intellectual property right (a patent) to the 
Scottish scientist James Watt on a new version (using a separate condenser) 
of the steam-powered engine.22 Such a link is not merely anecdotal. The 
modern steam-powered engine is considered to be the basis of the ‘thermo-
industrial Revolution’ that generalised the massive use of fossil fuels, 
particularly coal.23 Nor is the role of law in this symbolic origin anecdotal. 
Intellectual property rights are major tools for technology development, but 
also for technology entrenchment. Rather than looking merely at 
environmental protection laws to understand the role of law in the 
Anthropocene, lawyers would do well to look more widely at the laws shaping 
industrial organisation, working conditions, trade and investment, taxation 
and wealth distribution, or the very organisation of Nation-State system. We 
should even go further and revisit fundamental legal categories, such as 
‘causality’, ‘subject’, ‘obligation’, ‘property’, ‘responsibility/liability’, ‘legal 
personality’, ‘corporation’, ‘constitution’, ‘sovereignty’ to understand how 
they may have played (and may still play) a role in prompting and sustaining 
																																																								
environmental law see P.-M. Dupuy, J. E. Vinuales, International Environmental Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2015, 2nd edn. 2018).	
20  For an overview see J. Freeman, C. Kolstad (eds.), Moving to Markets in Environmental Regulation. 
Lessons from Twenty Years of Experience (Oxford University Press, 2006). 
21  See J. E. Viñuales, ‘La distribution de la charge de protéger l’environnement : Expressions 
juridiques de la solidarité’, in A. Supiot (ed.), Face à l’irresponsabilité: La dynamique de la solidarité (Paris: 
Conférences du College de France, 2018), pp. 19-36.	
22  Crutzen (2002), above n. 1. 
23  See J. Grinevald, ‘L’effet de serre et la civilisation thermo-industrielle 1896-1996’ (1997) 108 Revue 
européenne des sciences sociales 141. 
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the Anthropocene as well as how they may be adjusted or perhaps replaced 
in the law of more resilient and more respectful human societies. 
The task for lawyers and, in fact, for all those who seek to understand the 
implications of the Anthropocene narrative, is to look at law as one of the 
major technologies accounting for the Anthropocene; a ‘soft’ technology 
alongside the ‘hard’ technologies relating to energy, agriculture, chemicals, 
building, transportation, and others that seem to have captured most of the 
attention. It is important to understand that the way in which States or 
corporations or trade, investment and financial systems are organised is not 
of marginal importance to the emergence and operation of ‘hard’ 
technologies. An apposite illustration is provided by the conundrums of 
climate change mitigation policies. The existence of a collective action 
problem whereby the benefits of fossil fuel use are local (electricity, heat and 
transportation fuelling a country’s economy) and the costs (in terms of 
emissions of carbon dioxide) are spread across the entire globe presupposes 
the existence of sovereign and independent States, each with their own 
interests and right to pursue their own policies. Another illustration is given 
by the influence of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) on the price of oil (including its actual extraction and use, investment 
in further capacity and potential ‘lock-ins’ but also the ability of other 
technologies to emerge and disseminate in the face of price competition), 
which is premised on the sovereignty of States to use their natural resources 
in the way they see fit. In the past, such powers have been used to punish or 
pressurise oil-importing countries for political reasons or to drive potential 
competitors out of business. Aside from these two illustrations, the 
organisation of the international society in the form of sovereign States has 
many other implications regarding trade (or protectionism), investment, 
financial flows but also migration, disaster response or even disarmament (or 
arms races). The legal concept of sovereignty and its implications for the 
structure of both international and domestic law are, of course, the 
manifestation of social and political forces constantly at play. But the 
reflection of such forces through specific legal arrangements has profound 
implications on the activities driving the Anthropocene and, when 
disregarded (e.g. tensions regarding entitlements of different countries over a 
resource-rich and strategically important area) they could lead to devastating 
conflict. 
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Understanding the complex role of law as a soft technology in prompting, 
sustaining and potentially managing the Anthropocene is a far-reaching 
enterprise that cannot be conducted without some meaningful order or, in 
other words, without an initial reflexion on what are the most salient 
questions that need to be addressed and how they relate to each other and to 
the broader set of questions addressed in other disciplines of the humanities, 
social and natural sciences. The purpose of the following sections is to identify 
three broad clusters of questions for which the role of law is, in my view, 
particularly relevant. These clusters of questions are selected not only 
because of their importance to understand the role of law and legal analysis 
in the Anthropocene but also because they create bridges with the wider and 
integrative research agendas arising from both natural sciences and 
environmental humanities and social sciences. As in many other disciplines 
of human knowledge, the Anthropocene calls for a more general and 
comprehensive picture of the role of law rather than for ever-narrower 
specialisation. I would like to state this simple point as clearly as possible from 
the outset: if the role of law in prompting, sustaining and potentially 
managing the Anthropocene is to be elucidated and understood, it will not 
be through a specialised focus on or even an expansion of ‘environmental 
law’. We must instead revisit law in its entirety to understand its role in the 
Anthropocene. We must look at how our new condition, not merely as 
immersed in the Earth system but as a major driver of it, is related to law as 
a consolidated social practice or to some forms adopted by such practice at 
given points in time and space. We must look at the very DNA of law. I hope 
that this essay will help to clarify why. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
INGRAINING NATURE IN LAW 
 
 
 
1. Preliminary observations 
It is important, in designing the contours of this research agenda, to keep a 
clear focus on the role of law. This observation is intended to reassure 
impatient lawyers (or others interested in the role of law in the Anthropocene) 
as to the need for the detour that I am about to make. The detour is about 
the understanding of human agency in something as vast as geological time, 
where humans are latecomers and where there is a pervasive impression that 
the history and behaviour of humans is as irrelevant to the evolution of the 
Earth system as the latter is to the understanding of the former.  
There are many ways of formulating the disconnection between these two 
strata and I will review some of them later on, but the thrust of the 
disconnection or ‘dualism’ argument, which justifies the detour, holds (i) that 
human behaviour is too marginal a variable when it comes to understanding 
something as vast as geological evolution, (ii) that the connection between 
human history and environmental constraints may only be relevant in that 
environmental conditions affect humans, (iii) that the environmental 
conditions affecting humans are themselves cyclical and, with rare 
exceptions, such cycles remain unperturbed in a human timescale and (iv) in 
all events, modern technology – since the Industrial Revolution – has 
released human history from environmental constraints, which, given human 
newly acquired technological powers, are at best a variable among many 
others explaining human historical events as well as individual and social 
behaviour (a proposition underpinning several, perhaps most, social sciences 
and the foundations of modern philosophy since at least Descartes). In this 
regard, the Anthropocene concept has two main implications: first, contrary 
to proposition (i), human behaviour is not at all a marginal variable in 
geological evolution but may well be a definitional one; secondly, contrary to 
propositions (iii) and (iv), the potentially considerable environmental effects 
of human action not only on the Earth system but also – thereby – on humans 
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themselves call for a fundamental re-examination of our knowledge of the 
interactions between human action and natural processes.  
I will now analyse the implications of these propositions for the 
underpinnings of humanities and social sciences, and hence for law. I should 
add that the detour is not only intended to clarify the implications of the 
dualism debate for law but also to integrate the potential contribution of legal 
analysis into a broader research agenda on the Anthropocene. 
2. Human action and the Earth system 
Many works have charted the disconnection between natural history (and 
geological evolution) and human history as well as its implications.24 In an 
oft-cited article, the historian Dipesh Chakrabarti has taken stock of some of 
this work and looked more closely at the implications of human agency on 
climate change for the writing of history.25  His basic proposition is that 
‘anthropogenic explanations of climate change spell the collapse of the age-
old humanist distinction between natural history and human history’.26 To 
flesh out the meaning of this point, he refers to several towering figures 
ranging from Giambattista Vico – or more specifically the interpretation of 
the latter’s work by Benedetto Croce27 – to Robin G. Collingwood28 to E. H. 
Carr,29 whose work contributed to play down the importance of geological 
time for the understanding of human history. Indeed, over the XIX century 
the realisation of the depth and scale of geological time led to the conclusion 
that this stratum moved so slowly that its pace was almost imperceptible to 
the human eye and was better treated as an external and constant stage 
within which human history unfolded.30 Nature was thus seen as external 
and transcending human history.  																																																								
24  See P. Rossi, I segni del tempo: storia della Terra e storia delle nazioni da Hooke a Vico (Milano: Feltrinelli, 
1979) (providing a detailed history of the parallel evolution of natural and human historiography). 
25  D. Chakrabarty, ‘The climate of history: four theses’ (2009) 35 Critical Inquiry 197. 
26  Ibid., at 21. 
27  B. Croce, La filosofia di Giambattista Vico (Bari: Laterza, 2nd edn 1922), translated into English by 
R.G. Colingwood. 
28  E. H. Carr, What is History? (Cambridge University Press, 1961). 
29  D. Smail identifies three main intellectual contributions as the pillars of this revolution in the 
understanding of time, namely C. Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (1859), C. Lyell’s The Geological 
Evidences of the Antiquity of Man (1863), and J. Lubbock’s Pre-Historic Times (1865), D. L. Smail, On 
Deep History and the Brain (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), at 26. 
30  Bonneuil et Fressoz illustrate this point with the converging views of two eminent XIX century 
academics, the French historian Jules Michelet and the British geologist Charles Llyell. For 
Michelet ‘Since the beginning of the world a war started that will only end with the end of the 
world, not before; the war of man against nature, of spirit against matter, of freedom against 
fatality. History is nothing but the narrative of this everlasting fight [ … ] What must encourage us 
in this fight without end, is the fact that, overall, one of the terms does not change, and the other 
does change and becomes stronger. Nature remains the same, whereas every day man takes some 
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An analogous – albeit not entirely similar – disconnection lies at the 
foundations of social science since the XIX century. Here, the interaction 
targeted is that between human action and environmental constraints, and 
the disconnection between the two is seen as a condition for the emergence 
of a science of society and its dynamics. 31  In this context, the external 
character of natural processes and environmental constraints has a different 
root-cause than in historiography, namely the ability to escape 
environmental constraints based on the technological powers acquired by 
humans since the Industrial Revolution. But the end result, the disconnection 
of human and natural history and, more specifically, the independence of 
human action from natural constraints (reflected in the disciplines aimed at 
its understanding) is similar.  
Such a disconnection can be illustrated by the way mainstream 
environmental economics treats human impact on the environment, which 
is mostly through the microeconomic prism of market failures and 
externalities. At the macroeconomic level, the standard dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium (DSGE) model32 has rarely been used, if at all, to account 
for the impact of environmental degradation, perhaps because it is intended 
to look at a short time horizon. This family of models could perhaps 
incorporate wider environmental constraints, but mostly as an external shock 
or exogenous disturbance of the normal economic processes. In other words, 
environmental constraints and environmental change (e.g. natural resource 
depletion or pollution) are not part of such ‘normal’ processes, not even the 
changes of geological scale unveiled by the Anthropocene concept. They are 																																																								
advantage over it’, Jules Michelet, Introduction à l’histoire universelle (Paris: Hachette, 1831), at 5-7. A 
similar view is expressed by Lyell from the perspective of geology. He hypothesises that an 
‘intelligent being’ observing the action of humans may at first have the impression that human 
agency can change nature ‘but he would soon perceive that no one of the fixed and constant laws 
of the animate or inanimate world was subverted by human agency, and that the modifications 
produced were on the occurrence of new and extraordinary circumstances, and those not of a 
physical, but a moral nature. The deviation permitted, would also appear to be as slight as was 
consistent with the accomplishment of the new moral ends proposed, and to be in great degree 
temporary in its nature, so that whenever the power of the new agent was withheld, even for a 
brief period, a relapse would take place to the ancient state of things’, C. Lyell, Principles of Geology, 
being an Attempt to Explain the Former Changes of the Earth’s Surface, by Reference to Causes Now in Operation 
(London: John Murray, 1830), vol. 1, at 164. Both referred to in Bonneil/Fressoz, above n. 1, 41-
42 (our translation of Michelet’s French text). 
31  See e.g. A. Comte, Cours de philosophie positive (Paris: Bachelier, 1839), vol. 4, at 251 (‘The local 
physical causes, very powerful at the origins of civilisation, have progressively lost their grip as the 
natural course of human development increasingly allows to neutralise their action’), 
Bonneil/Fressoz, above n. 1, at 45 (our translation of the French text). 
32  The origins of DSGE modelling in neoclassical economics are often situated in the paper by F. E. 
Kydland, E. C. Prescott, ‘Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations’ (1982) 50/6 Econometrica 
1345.  
J. E. Viñuales  In Our Hands? 
_________________________________________________________________________________	
	 18 
‘external’ or abnormal or, to continue the line of reasoning introduced earlier 
in this essay, they are not part of core transactions. An important question in 
this regard concerns the extent to which the understanding of human 
behaviour that arises from a social science as influential as economics can 
continue to treat environmental change as merely external, even as a major 
stochastic shock, or should instead integrate it as part of its foundations or 
‘normality’.  
In both humanities – here historiography33 – and social sciences – here 
economics34 – there have been major efforts at addressing this disconnection 
through the creation of new disciplines or clusters of disciplines. As I shall 
discuss next, the disconnection has also characterised law but, unlike other 
disciplines, law has until recently remained impervious to the 
Anthropocene’s core message. 
3. The disconnection between law and nature 
3.1. Overview 
The perceived disconnection between the natural and the human strata also 
underpins our contemporary understanding of law. Much like mainstream 
historiography and economics, in the last two centuries, law and legal studies 
have increasingly treated nature as an external object.  
This can be observed from three main perspectives, namely the deliberate 
detachment of law from nature (or the ontological dualism of the natural and 
human strata in law) in positivistic accounts of law (3.2.), the expanded 
horizon of law in the Anthropocene as a normative construct regulating the 
actions of the human geological force (3.3.), and the need to go beyond the 
mere regulation of negative externalities in order to genuinely ingrain nature 
in law (3.4.).  
The conceptions of nature underpinning these perspectives vary. 
Positivistic accounts of law first attempted to disentangle law from some 
religious conceptions, while still relying on other metaphysical conceptions 
of morals. Even in the attempt at developing a ‘pure’ conception of law, the 
legal technology distilled remains tributary of certain ontological 																																																								
33  See e.g. Robin/Steffen, above n. 1; Chakrabarty, above n. 25; E. Russell, Evolutionary History: 
Uniting History and Biology to Understand Life on Earth (Cambridge University Press, 2011).  
34  A pioneer study was published in 1971 by N. Georgescu-Roegen, The Enthropy Law and the Economic 
Process (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1971). For an overview of the now well 
developed field of ecological economics see R. Costanza, ‘What is Ecological Economics?’ (1989) 
1 Ecological Economics 1. 
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conceptions. Yet, positivism, at least in its purest forms, is largely indifferent 
to whether the understanding of nature refers to a created nature spanning a 
few thousand years or a biosphere (today we would say an Earth system) 
consisting of constantly interacting processes spanning billions of years. For 
positivism, the goal is for law to become a value-free technology. The specific 
conception of nature is more important from the second perspective, because 
it is only in some conceptions that humans may at all become a geological 
force whose impact must be kept under check. This is also the case from the 
third perspective because different conceptions of nature entail different 
conceptions of the relations between humans and nature, which, in turn, 
shape the way in which human action is modelled (as a mere externality to 
be corrected or as a dynamic force capable of triggering a change of – rather 
than a change within – the system).  
3.2. Law detached from nature 
3.2.1. An (un-)intended consequence of legal positivism 
The rise of a certain form of legal positivism can be compared, in many ways, 
to the process through which humanities and social sciences were detached 
from geological time and environmental constraints. As a philosophical 
matter, legal positivism, in its more condensed understanding, holds that 
whether a norm is law or not does not depend on its content but on how it 
has been created (posited).35 There is of course much debate not only about 
the truth of this proposition but also about the extent to which it accurately 
depicts the core of legal positivism. It is, however, on a different plane that 
legal positivism deserves attention here, namely as an influential 
understanding of law and legal processes.  
From the perspective of intellectual history, legal positivism can indeed be 
considered as a declaration of independence from religion, morals but also 
natural reason or other metaphysical accounts. It is an attempt at building a 
true ‘science of law’ (Rechtswissenschaft) which, in the first positivist accounts, 
was to be independent from certain specific metaphysical conceptions of 																																																								
35  This foundational meaning is usually traced back to the work of J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence 
Determined (London: John Murray, 1832). Legal positivism is traditionally understood as having 
emerged with the philosophical work of Jeremy Bentham (Of Laws in General, London: Athlone 
Press, 1970 [1782]), influenced by the works of David Hume and Thomas Hobbes, and influencing 
Austin and his conception of ‘command’. Two different conceptions of legal positivism which have 
exercised immense influence over the XX century are those of Hans Kelsen (Reine Rechtslehre : 
Einleitung in die rechtswissenschaftiche Problematik (Leipzig ; Wien : F. Deuticke, 1934)) and Herbert 
Hart (The Concept of Law (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1961)).  
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nature36 and, in time, it aimed at not being reliant on any such conception. 
Such a science of law was to focus on humans and not – in any way – on 
nature. The dissociation of the human and natural strata is particularly 
visible in some expressions of legal positivism. The immensely influential 
work of the Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen attempted to and, in many ways, 
succeeded in developing law as a detached technology. I do not mean by this 
that the conceptual construction of Kelsen (or other supporters of legal 
positivism) is flawless and that it actually managed, from a theoretical 
standpoint, to evacuate metaphysics. It is as an intellectual and social project, 
as an effort to mobilise lawyers and other intellectuals into thinking about 
law differently, that positivism has thrived, much like empirical – particularly 
quantitative – approaches to social science (from sociology, to economics, to 
political science) have thrived since the second half of the XX century.  
Detaching law and its science from metaphysical conceptions of nature 
was thus an enterprise comparable to that of building empirical (by contrast 
to normative) social sciences. As an enterprise it had, and still has great merit, 
and it enabled great advances in the way law is created, applied and analysed. 
Yet, much like for humanities and social sciences, legal positivism 
deliberately sought to dissociate any conception of nature from the 
foundations and remit of a science of law. As noted in Kelsen’s preface to a 
synthesis volume in English (General Theory of Law and the State) bringing 
together and reorganising his work on the ‘pure theory of law’:  
‘When this doctrine is called the ‘pure theory of law’, it is meant that it is being kept free 
from all the elements foreign to the specific method of a science whose only purpose is the 
cognition of law, not its formation. A science has to describe its object as it actually is, not to 
prescribe how it should be or should not be from the point of view of some specific value 
judgments. The latter is a problem of politics and, as such, concerns the art of government, 
an activity directed at values, not an object of science, directed at reality. The reality, however, 
at which a science of law is directed, is not the reality of nature which constitutes the object of natural science. 
If it is necessary to separate the science of law from politics, it is no less necessary to separate it from natural 
science. One of the most difficult tasks of a general theory of law is that of determining the specific reality of 
its subject and of showing the difference that exists between legal and natural reality’37 
The representative value of this opening statement, or of a major book, or 
even of a major author, such as Kelsen, is of course not enough to 
demonstrate that law underwent a disconnection analogous to that of other 
																																																								
36  See D. Priel, ‘Toward Classical Legal Positivism’ (2015) 101 Virginia Law Review 987 (arguing that, 
in fact, Hobbes and Bentham understood their theory of law as derived from a broader – if 
idionsyncratic – metaphysical conception, distinct from that of natural law proponents). 
37  H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and the State (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1945), at 
xiv (italics added).   
J. E. Viñuales  In Our Hands? 
_________________________________________________________________________________	
	 21 
disciplines. It is offered here as a carefully selected illustration of this forceful 
and influential attempt. 
The phenomenon illustrated here by the reference to H. Kelsen’s writings 
was charted in the early 1900s by one of the most prominent and influential 
social thinkers of the century, namely Max Weber.38 Weber saw in the higher 
level of ‘rationality’ of European law, as compared to the laws of other 
regions, one of the explanations of the rise of industrial capitalism in the 
West. By rationality, Weber meant a variety of features of European law 
including a highly differentiated legal organisation (distinct from political 
administration and religion, and in the hands of a specialised professional 
class of lawyers), a creation process that emphasised the conscious and 
deliberate act of making law as detached from immutable tradition and 
religious interference, and concrete decision-making based on prior rules of 
general and universal application. Importantly, Weber clarified that 
capitalism was not itself the driver of the special features of European law 
but, rather, that such features had been particularly favourable for the 
emergence of industrial capitalism. What led to the development of a 
European law with distinct features is a type of political organisation, the 
bureaucratically organised State, relying not on tradition or charismatic 
power but increasingly on logically formal rationality. And what made 
rational law socially effective was a combination of factors including the 
historical separation in Europe of the spiritual and secular orders, the 
influence of Roman law, the bureaucratic organisation of the Catholic 
Church itself, the use of legally organised and trained bureaucracies for rulers 
to impose their power, the need to compose with social constituencies – 
particularly the bourgeoisie – to consolidate such power, and the functional 
separation of activities within the legal sphere between the enactment of law 
and its application to concrete situations.39 The higher level of rationality 
that Weber ascribed to European law can be equated, although he did not 
frame the question in those terms,40 to the more positivistic or technical 																																																								
38  M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie (Tubingen : J.C.B. Mohr, 4th 
edn 1956). English translation : Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (Berkeley : 
University of California Press, edn by G. Roth & R. Wittich, 1968), part II, section VIII : Economy 
and Law (The Sociology of Law), pp. 641ff. For an illuminating study of the link between the 
development of Western capitalism and the rationalisation of law in Weber’s writings see D. M. 
Trubek, ‘Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism’ (1972) Wisconsin Law Review 720. In this 
paragraph, I follow Trubek’s account. 
39  See Trubek, above n. 38, at 738. 
40  In fact, Weber took into account the wide acceptance in the Western world of the idea of a rational 
natural law that would provide further support for the rational and general rules governing the 
State. See ibid, at 738. 
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nature of such law. This is particularly clear as regards the functional 
specialisation of law and law-making processes. And a system of rational and 
generally applicable law is particularly favourable to the development of 
capitalism because of its higher predictability (calculability or what we would 
today call ‘optimisation’) and, substantively, the room it would allow for 
market freedoms and contractual practices.41 The latter point highlights the 
interest of rational positivistic law as a form of market organisation law but it 
also suggests that market forces were supposed to be left evolve according to 
their own interests. As summarised by D. M. Trubek: 
‘At least some areas of social life had to be freed of the bonds of kinship, religion, and other 
foci of traditional authority, and, at the same time, insulated from the arbitrary action of the 
state. This required that the state, as legal order, be strengthened, so that it superseded other 
sources of social control, and at the same time be limited, so that it did not encroach upon 
areas of economic action. The state was to provide a formal order, or facilitative framework 
within which free economic actors could operate.’42 
This is precisely the conception according to which first comes the ability to 
transact and only then the consideration and potential regulation of its effects 
on third parties (e.g. neighbours or workers) or the environment.  
In stating this conclusion, it is not my intention to take a stance on the 
merits of legal positivism (or the conception of law as a technology) as 
compared to the – often simplified43 – natural law conceptions against which 
positivism reacted. Both may have desirable and undesirable implications. 
Understanding law only as technology detaches it from any underpinning 
values and makes it capable of serving the most reprehensible aims, as has 
been widely shown by the laws of Nazi Germany or South Africa under the 
apartheid regime. It may be argued, however, that these and other infamous 
misuses of a legal order are, in fact, expressions of ‘naturalised’ law in that 
law is used to translate a purported ‘natural order’, whether it is Aryan or 
White supremacy. But the distinction can be made in a less extreme context, 
which will perhaps be more telling. Asked about the meaning for a farmer in 
Ancient Greece of the unrelenting labouring of his land, the French Hellenist 
J.-P. Vernent answered that it should be seen as a prayer, an act through 
which the farmer participated in the order of the World.44 How different this 																																																								
41  Ibid, at 740. 
42  Ibid, at 744. 
43  The ‘natural law’ against which positivism reacted was a stylised conception hardly representative 
of the complexity and variety of a historical tradition dating back to at least Ancient Greece and 
perhaps earlier. 
44  I am indebted to Alain Supiot for sharing with me his conversation with Jean-Pierre Vernent on 
this topic.	
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is from the work on an assembly line or even in a farm when purpose is lost. 
As often noted by Alain Supiot, when labour is organised in a commoditised 
manner, the very purpose of work becomes, at best, a secondary matter. In 
an analogous manner, two different conceptions of law, one as an expression 
of the natural order with a transcending purpose or the other as an 
optimisation technology with a focus on efficiency, may lead to very different 
conceptions of the meaning of work. But (re-)naturalising law may be far 
from a panacea as well, as suggested by the diminished status of the Dalit in 
India who, despite many governmental attempts – including a Constitutional 
clause – to improve their condition, are still viewed and largely treated as 
beyond the natural order of Hinduism. The same would be true of any legal 
oppressive legal organisation that claims to be based on a natural order or 
natural selection. The point I hope to make is therefore much simpler and of 
an empirical character. Disconnecting law from its embeddedness in 
religious, moral and cultural values has implications for the development of 
law as a discipline and a social process. As discussed next, such implications 
transpire in the very ontology reflected in a given legal order.  
3.2.2. Illustration: conceptions of property  
An example can help illustrate how different conceptions of nature translate 
into different legal ontologies and how deliberately displacing any relation to 
such conceptions (and implicitly endorsing some others) is not an innocuous 
step.  
The idea of property can be translated into many different legal forms, 
each with different implications. The way in which property is organised in 
a given legal order reflects normative conceptions of the world or, in most 
cases, sedimented layers of such conceptions. Thus, whereas there may be 
significant overlaps between the conceptions of property in civil law systems 
(as the ‘sum of its attributes’) and the Anglo-American doctrine of property 
as a ‘bundle of rights’,45 the two ontologies differ at the very least in their 
representation of the powers and duties of the property holder. The Roman-
influenced top-down characterisation found in most civil law systems 
(property as a sum of three pre-defined conceptual attributes, i.e. usus, fructus 
and abusus46) is less case-specific and fine-grained that the variety of rights, 																																																								
45  Y. Emerich, ‘Regard civiliste sur le droit des biens de la common law: pour une conception 
transsystémique de la propriété’ (2008) 38 Revue générale de droit 339, at 346-349. 
46  Ibid., at 346, referring to the foundational work of C. Aubry, C.-F. Rau, Cours de droit civil français 
(Paris: Librairies techniques, 7nd edn by P. Esmein, 1961), vol. 2, pp. 236-238. 
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prerogatives and duties – more than eleven according to some authors47 – 
that together characterise property (or ownership) in bottom-up common law 
systems (which appear mostly as collections of observations more or less 
generalised into a set of categories). In turn, none of these conceptions, 
however detailed, pay genuine attention to potential harm to future 
generations or the environment as such. At best, they capture it tangentially 
or through significant conceptual re-elaboration. 48  For these other 
dimensions to be brought into the picture, resort to other related concepts 
such as the public trust doctrine49  or the principle of inter-generational 
equity50 or, still, some regulatory duties to protect land, wildlife, forests or 
waterbodies, appear necessary. In the classical conceptions of property, 
either in the civil or common law traditions, negative externalities were only 
taken into account or even identified to a limited extent, mostly in the form 
of civil responsibility or tort law or of some good neighbourliness duties. 
Concepts such as the public trust doctrine or inter-generational equity or, 
more generally, regulatory duties concerning the environment were 
borrowed from other contexts or simply added as a layer of law placing 
bounds on the enjoyment of property.  
The need for resorting to such other external or additional concepts to 
capture externalities contrasts sharply with the conception of communal 
property of some indigenous peoples, where land is never fully held by an 
individual but belongs to the community – past, present and future – as a 
whole. In such conceptions, respect for future generations and land itself is 
deeply ingrained in the very idea that such communities have of what we call 
property and does not require an additional layer of duties. The level at 
which this difference can be situated is not limited to the concept of property 
but concerns the entire legal ontology ingrained in the community’s 
conception of law. Legal or normative notions can seldom be described in 
isolation because their very characterisation relies on their relations to other 																																																								
47  Ibid., at 347, referring to A. M. Honoré, ‘Ownership’, in A. G. Guest (ed.), Oxford Essays in 
Jurisprudence (Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 107-147, at 113.  
48  See e.g. the doctrine of the ‘ecological function of property’ developed by the High Court of Brazil 
(Supremo Tribunal de Justiça) in See S.T.J., REsp No. 1.240.122/PR, at 7-9, 2d Panel, Rel. Min. 
Antonio Herman Benjamin, 28.06.2009, D.Je. 11.09.2012. 
49  See J. L. Sax, ‘The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention’ (1970) 68 Michigan Law Review 471. For a practical application, see the decision of the 
Supreme Court of India in Mehta v. Kamal Nath et al. (1996), [1997] 1 SSC 388. 
50  See E. Brown Weiss, ‘The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity’, (1984) 11 
Ecology Law Quarterly 495. For a practical application see the decision of the Supreme Court of the 
Philippines in Minors Oposa v Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) 33 
ILM (1994) 173 (30 July 1993). 
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such notions. The practical consequences of such a distinction for the legal 
organisation of human relations to nature must not be underestimated, and 
they have been recognised in practice in several cases concerning extractive 
industries’ projects in countries such as Nicaragua, 51  Paraguay, 52  or 
Ecuador 53  without the need for exceptional resort to supplementing 
concepts.54 As noted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in a 
leading case: 
‘the close ties of indigenous people with the land must be recognized and understood as the 
fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity, and their economic 
survival. For indigenous communities, relations to the land are not merely a matter of possession 
and production but a material and spiritual element which they must fully enjoy, even to preserve their cultural 
legacy and transmit it to future generations’55 
The Court used Article 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights,56 
which recognises the right to property, as a suitable vehicle to give effect to 
the relationship between an indigenous people and its ancestral land. But, in 
truth, there is a part of incommensurability between the two notions. The 
conclusions of the Court in this and subsequent cases, most notably requiring 
the respondent State to integrate such communal entitlements into the land 
register and, more generally, into the legal order, suggest that the relationship 
between an indigenous people and its ancestral land needs to be reduced or 
re-coded before it can be given effect in a legal system akin to what Weber 
called European law, with all its diversity but also its – in some respects 
converging – ontology. 
Beyond the specific illustration of property, the deliberate attempt to 
detach law from at least certain metaphysical conceptions of nature as well 
as the efforts to conceptualise law as a pure technique, however useful, also 
have implications for the role of law in prompting, sustaining and potentially 
managing the massive human impacts on the Earth system unveiled by the 
Anthropocene narrative. From the perspective of the research agenda 
proposed here, this conclusion raises questions relating to the ways in which 
law and metaphysical conceptions of nature may be interwoven with each 
other, to the processes through which law has been detached from nature 																																																								
51  See Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, ICtHR Series C No. 79, Judgment (31 
August 2001) 
52  See Case of Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v Paraguay, ICtHR Series C No 146 (29 March 2006), 
paragraph 118 (indigenous conception of property) 
53  See Indigenous People Kichwa of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, ICtHR Series C No. 245, Judgment (merits and 
compensation)(27 June 2012), paragraphs 145-147 (indigenous conception of property) 
54  See above n. 49 and 50. 
55  Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, above n. 51, para 149 (italics added). 
56  American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
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and the implications of such detachment, and to the (un)desirability and 
potential avenues through which the two could be reconnected. As discussed 
next, the detachment of law from nature relies on an important yet implicit 
assumption, namely that human action could never become a nature-
changing force of geological proportions. Indeed, the assumption of a natural 
‘theatre’ that is external and immutable is deeply ingrained in virtually all 
legal concepts, as in most ethical systems until the second half of the XX 
century. However, the Anthropocene narrative emphasises that this 
assumption is questionable, and it calls for a redefinition of the assumptions 
on which legal concepts are based. 
3.3. The horizon of law in the Anthropocene 
3.3.1. Hans Jonas and the horizon of ethics 
The work of the German philosopher Hans Jonas 57  provides a useful 
starting-point to explore a general question relating to a major and implicit 
assumption underpinning our legal concepts.  
The new far-reaching powers that humans have conquered through the 
development of technology, and their implications for nuclear warfare, 
ecological degradation or genetic engineering, exceed the horizon of 
traditional ethics. Jonas’ work – much as the Anthropocene narrative today 
– highlighted that irrespectively of the particular strand of ethics, it has been 
assumed that the normative guidance provided by ethical principles mainly 
concerned contemporary relations among humans living in a society. This is 
not to say that ethical principles cannot be adapted or extended beyond 
human relations (e.g. relations with different entities in nature) or beyond 
contemporaneity (e.g. relations to humans in the past or the future). But the 
immensity of the new powers acquired by humans and their potentially 
devastating effects on the Earth system as a whole called, in Jonas’ opinion, 
for much more. At the very least, it called for an ethics specifically (rather 
than tangentially) concerned with the implications of such unprecedented 
powers and based on a reformulated understanding of responsibility. 
																																																								
57  H. Jonas, In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age (Chicago IL : University of Chicago Press, 
1984) (translation by H. Jonas and David Herr of Jonas’ book originally published in German : Das 
Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation (Frankfurt am Main : 
Suhrkamp, 1979)) ; H. Jonas, ‘Philosophy at the End of the Century : Survey of its Past and Future’ 
(1994) 61/4 Social Research 815 (see, particularly, Jonas’ discussion of the ecological crisis starting at 
page 826). 
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Jonas’ point is of great relevance also for other normative constructs such 
as law. Much like ethics, law does not merely seek to reflect reality through a 
variety of concepts but also to norm it. In other words, law – as ethics – is not 
a mere mirror of reality but a purposeful mirror. It seeks to both represent 
and orient behaviour. In point of fact, the main reason why it seeks to 
accurately represent reality is because it attempts to norm it. In this context, 
the newly acquired powers of humans have to be reflected to some extent in 
ethical and legal concepts, both for accuracy and normative (governance) 
purposes. Yet, as noted earlier in this essay, the prevailing approach followed 
by most legal systems is to address the externalities of the very transactions 
that have led, at least in part, to the Anthropocene. The organisation of the 
transactions’ core has only been comprehensively reshaped in rare occasions, 
such as the ban of slavery and forced labour, or in contexts where the re-
organisation has led to no less severe impacts on both humans and the 
natural environment, such as in communist planned economic production. 
3.3.2. The task for law 
Taking due account of human technological powers entailed, for H. Jonas, 
revisiting the foundations of ethics to ingrain an unprecedented level of 
responsibility on humans. Broadly speaking, the task of law in the 
Anthropocene is no different than that of ethics: it has to ingrain the 
unprecedented implications of human technological power in its 
foundational concepts. Much like for ethics, the question is not merely 
whether existing legal concepts can be extended and adjusted to reflect the 
new human condition but, more generally, whether new legal ontologies 
must be developed that are specifically (not just tangentially) concerned with 
the geological implications of human powers.  
An additional difficulty faced by law arises from its social regulatory 
function. As noted by Jonas, it is not for philosophy to work out what he 
called the ‘actual articles of a possible peace pact’ between mind (i.e. human 
technological power) and nature, but only to give the general argument and 
direction. The specificities would be the task of ‘practical experts’ and: 
‘[a]ll the sciences concerning nature and human beings, concerning economics, politics and 
society, must cooperate in drafting a planetary statement of condition along with suggestions 
for arriving at a budget balanced between human beings and nature’.58 
																																																								
58  Jonas (1994), above n. 57, at 830. 
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By its very function, law would be in the important and difficult position of 
translating such specific approaches and practical steps. It would continue to 
be a technology, but with different goals and foundations. Indeed, in order 
to do so, much like ethics for its own task (setting the overall direction), we 
must find an appropriate legal language, i.e. a set of interrelated legal 
concepts capable of spelling out the new (or the diversity of new) 
programme(s), or we must sufficiently reformulate the prevailing legal 
ontologies. 
Developing appropriate legal concepts may not merely consist in adding 
some new concepts or layers of concepts (e.g. the precautionary approach or 
other ‘principles’59) or in fine-tuning some old ones (e.g. the extension of the 
concept of damage to cover also the so-called ‘pure ecological damage’60). It 
may require to entirely redefining some concepts (e.g. as suggested by the 
example of property, discussed in the previous section) or, more 
fundamentally, redefining the entire legal cartography or language used to 
represent and norm the world, establishing new concepts and relations 
among them.  
Ingraining in the law the unprecedented level of responsibility arising for 
humans raises several questions from the perspective of the present research 
agenda starting with the identification of the most relevant legal concepts and 
implications, and ending with the potential redefinition of the entire legal 
language or ontology. The main initial question is indeed whether existing 
legal concepts adequately translate the unprecedented level of responsibility 
of humans in the Anthropocene. Depending on the answer, the next question 
would concern the identification of the concepts that could be added or 
reworked (expanded, redefined, suppressed) and the exploration of the 
interactions among such revisited concepts and the wider legal order. In the 
end, what is at stake is whether a new legal ontology, a more precise 
language, should be developed in order to fully reflect the new level of 
responsibility of humans. Brought back to our current understanding of the 
role of law with respect to the environment, what is called into question is the 
sufficiency of addressing our ecological crisis through the sole prism of 
																																																								
59  This seems to be, however, the approach suggested in some of the environmental law literature. 
See e.g. Robinson (2012) and (2014), above n. 16. 
60  For an overview of approaches taken in international and comparative law, see M. Anderson, A. 
Boyle (eds.), Environmental Damage in International and Comparative Law. Problems of Definition and Valuation 
(Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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negative externalities or external (stochastic) shocks, which is the prevailing 
prism in environmental law. 
3.4. Revisiting foundational concepts 
3.4.1. Transactions-externalities: the external logic of environmental law 
The way in which the legal protection of the environment emerged and 
developed mainly from the 1950s onwards clearly conveys the assumption 
that the environment is an external object.61  
Whether it is through personal-injury based techniques (e.g. through tort 
law doctrines of nuisance or civil law doctrines of abus de droit, and more 
recently environmental liability and human rights litigation) or through 
impact limitation techniques (e.g. environmental impact assessments, 
environmental permitting, zoning and protection of designated areas, 
pollution limitation standards, taxation, or market mechanisms), the 
assumption is that the legal system first organises social processes, such as 
defining subjects, rights, duties, devolution of powers, general taxation, 
corporate structures, economic freedoms, labour relations, horizontal 
relations (e.g. tort and contract law), etc., and only then it adds a layer of 
regulation aimed at protecting the environment. It sets bounds to (it 
‘regulates’) the effects of a pre-established system. 
In order to preserve the foundational legal categories and their goals, such 
an additional layer may even be organised on the basis of the very same 
concepts used to pursue the implicit value system ingrained in law (e.g. the 
quest for growth and efficiency). 62  By way illustration, law may grant 
property rights (‘sovereign rights’) over the resources located in the exclusive 
economic zones of States63 in order to strengthen the incentives of coastal 
States to protect such resources (e.g. fisheries), or it may create rights to 
pollute within tolerable levels, as for a variety of allowances relating to the 
																																																								
61  There is no major historical account looking at the development of domestic environmental law 
across countries. With some rare exceptions (e.g. R. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law 
(Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 2004, focusing on the United States), one must resort to 
the initial chapters of environmental law textbooks in the relevant jurisdictions. 
62  See e.g. D. Grinlinton, P. Taylor (eds), Property Rights and Sustainability: The Evolution of Property Rights 
to meet Ecological Challenges (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2011) (the contributors to this edited volume 
offer a critical perspective on property rights as tool for environmental protection and discuss 
different adjustments and reformulations). 
63  Under the international law of sea, as codified by the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397, Part V, coastal States have ‘sovereign rights’, i.e. 
exclusive jurisdiction, over the exploitation of natural resources in the water column extending up 
to 200 nautical miles from their baselines.  
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emissions of sulphur dioxide64 or carbon dioxide65 to reduce pollution while 
achieving efficiency. In both cases, the implications of property (the 
possibility of appropriation or the externalities of using property in certain 
ways) are addressed by resorting to an extension of property concepts 
(sovereign rights or rights to pollute). This approach contrasts with the 
possibility of reverting to other notions of property or reformulating its very 
understanding, as discussed in section 3.2.2, to integrate respect for nature 
and future generations.  
Such a choice may be entirely legitimate if its implications for the overall 
operation of a legal order or for society are fully understood as well as 
deliberately and legitimately chosen. But even in more traditional forms of 
environmental regulation, such as the requirement of a prior environmental 
impact assessment, the approach remains supplemental in that it simply adds 
a requirement for the conduct of an activity that is otherwise fully organised 
through the laws relating to corporate structures, economic freedoms, 
property rights, contractual arrangements, labour relations, and others. Such 
structures, freedoms, rights and arrangements are not themselves 
reformulated. The corporate form keeps its personality and governance 
arrangements, protecting shareholders from creditors of the corporation as 
well as corporate assets from shareholders and their creditors. Economic 
freedoms tend to be extended rather than restricted by the privatisation of 
activities formerly deemed to be public in nature, such as utilities or even 
security. Property rights are multiplied and found to govern more and more 
parcels of reality, including a clean atmosphere or clean water or still ‘natural 
capital’. Contractual arrangements become increasingly standardised and 
complex, leaving limited bargaining power to some parties and largely 
substituting for public action.  
These are but some illustrations of the legal organisation that Max Weber 
considered to be initially conducive to the rise of capitalism and later 
promoted and increasingly shaped by it. It is premised on the idea of the 
market as a spontaneous regulator and, more fundamentally, on the idea of 
efficiency (maximising utility and a minimal cost). Cost internalisation of 
negative externalities through market mechanisms partakes in this approach. 
But so does environmental and social regulation, as it is now conceived, 																																																								
64  See G. Chan, R. Stavins, R. Stowe, R. Sweeney, ‘The SO2 allowance-trading system and the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: Reflections on 20 years of policy innovation’ (2012) 65 
National Tax Journal 419. 
65  See D. Freestone, C. Streck (eds.), Legal Aspects of Carbon Trading (Oxford University Press, 2009).  
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namely as an additional layer of law targeting the effects of separately 
organised transactions. We have lost sight of how idiosyncratic and 
culturally-situated the growth and efficiency-based legal organisation of 
society and its relations with nature are. Comparative law but also non-legal 
disciplines such as historiography and anthropology could help to broaden 
the perspective that we have on our legal concepts and conceptions through 
the essay of entirely different legal ontologies and of how the relations 
between humans and nature are organised in them.  
3.4.2. Illustrations: conceptions of sovereignty and causality 
As before, providing some illustrations of the distinction between legal 
concepts addressing the externality and those that capture the transaction’s 
core may be useful to clarify its practical implications.  
The first illustration is provided by the concept of State sovereignty in 
international law. States have powers over the organisation of their economic 
activities and the exploitation of their natural resources within their territory 
or jurisdiction. Such a distribution of powers, which is a major cause of the 
collective action problem leading to increasing emissions of greenhouse 
gases,66 is based on a distribution of political power legally expressed through 
the concept of sovereignty. States are ‘sovereign’ in that they are independent 
from all other States and have the full and exclusive exercise of public 
prerogatives within their territory.67 Unrestricted use of such powers may 
have deleterious effects on the environment of other States or beyond 
national jurisdiction. As a result, the exercise of such powers has been subject 
to an additional layer of regulation at the international level, including norms 
such as the prevention principle, the principle of cooperation or the 
requirement to conduct a prior environmental impact assessment.68 In this 																																																								
66  See the study by S. Barrett, Environment and Statecraft (Oxford University Press, 2003) (discussing 
how the political organization expressed by the concept of sovereignty limits cooperation). 
67  See Island of Palmas Case (or Miangas) (United States v Netherlands), Award (4th April 1928), II RIAA 
829 (where the sole arbitrator, the Swiss Max Huber, stated the most influential understanding of 
the concept of territorial sovereignty, still valid today: ‘Sovereignty in the relations between States 
signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise 
therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State. The development of the 
national organisation of States during the last few centuries and, as a corollary, the development 
of international law, have established this principle of the exclusive competence of the State in 
regard to its own territory in such a way as to make it the point of departure in settling most 
questions that concern international relations’, at 838).  
68  See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 13 June 1992, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26, principles 2 (prevention), 17 (environmental impact assessment), 18-19 
(cooperation). For a detailed commentary of this foundational instrument see J. E. Viñuales (ed.), 
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2015). 
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approach, the environment is an external object for the protection of which 
the exercise of sovereignty is restricted to some extent.69 To move beyond the 
current binary approach whereby sovereignty is first asserted and then some 
limits to its exercise are added, the very concept of sovereignty would need 
to be shaken to its roots. Some scholars have argued in favour of a 
reconceptualisation of sovereignty as a form of stewardship or trusteeship, 
not merely for the benefit of a State’s population, as in mainstream 
democratic theory, but also for the benefit of those beyond it.70 The very 
need to respect the environment would no longer be an ad hoc limitation of 
sovereignty but an integral part of it, much like in the example of communal 
property discussed in section 3.2.2. 
Another example of a basic legal concept that is challenged by the 
Anthropocene narrative is that of ‘causality’. There are different theories of 
causality in both domestic (e.g. tort law) and international law (e.g. State 
responsibility) and they all convey, whether explicitly or implicitly, a value 
judgment or normative choice of what consequences are to be legally 
attributed to a given act/omission of an agent. Such value judgments are 
culturally-situated but they also respond to practical considerations. In a 
traditional causation of fact principle or ‘causalité adéquate’ test, some 
consequences of actions would escape attribution if the link between a 
specific tortious act and the injury suffered by the victim cannot be 
established at the relevant standard of proof (e.g. preponderance of the 
evidence). This understanding of causality could be expanded to give more 
room to scientific and fairness considerations. Ronald Dworkin has 
highlighted the normative dimensions of such an extension by reference to 
the imaginary case of Mrs Sorenson 71  (conceptually reflecting the well-																																																								
69  This is the thesis expounded by N. Shrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources. Balancing Rights and Duties 
(Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
70  For two prominent examples see F. Francioni, ‘Realism, Utopia and the Future of International 
Environmental Law’, in A. Cassese (ed.), Realizing Utopia. The Future of International Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2012), pp. 442-460; E. Benvenisti, ‘Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the 
Acocuntability of States to Foreign Stateholders (2013) 107/2 American Journal of International Law 
295.  
71  See R. Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), at 143 (‘Mrs. 
Sorenson suffered from rheumatoid arthritis and for many years took a generic drug—inventum—
to relieve her suffering. During that period inventum was manufactured and marketed under 
different trade names by eleven different pharmaceutical companies. In fact the drug had serious 
and undisclosed side-effects, of which the manufacturers should have known, and Mrs. Sorenson 
suffered permanent cardiac damage from taking it. She was unable to prove which manufacturer’s 
pills [ … ] had actually injured her. She sued all the drug companies who had manufactured 
inventum, together, and her lawyers argued that each of them was liable to her in proportion to 
its share of the market in the drug over the years of her treatment. The drug companies replied 
that the plaintiff’s request was entirely novel and contradicted the long established premise of tort 
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known case Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories72) where the traditional rule of liability 
requiring causation is overcome by a theory of ‘market-share liability’, under 
which each proved contributor to the problem is liable to the extent of its 
contribution, measured by its market share, even if a causality link with the 
specific damage suffered by the victim is not established. Market-share 
liability is a legal approach to fill a gap left by the conventional requirements 
of causation. Its legal nature has been debated,73 but its operation would 
allow for a legal extension (based on a normative choice) of a factual 
relationship that cannot be fully established scientifically. However, applying 
such an expanded conception of causality (where, in fact, the tortious act is 
considered to be that of a group of defendants taken together, which is then 
causally related to the injury) in the context of Earth system change remains 
particularly challenging because the group deemed to commit a tortious act 
is not easily identifiable (it would include, at the very least, portions of past 
and present generations, with different sectors involved) and the injury itself 
cannot easily be attributed to a major environmental disruption (e.g. whereas 
climate change increases the frequency of several extreme weather events, 
attributing a specific event to it – e.g. the hurricane that took place on a given 
day of May – remains scientifically difficult). In many ways, the main legal 
shield still protecting those groups and countries responsible for climate 
change-inducing emissions is the prevailing understanding of causality. As 
with the concept of sovereignty, a reconceptualisation of the legal principle 
of causality would have to ingrain the complexity of natural processes within 
law, that is capturing complexity as understood in science (e.g. in climate 
modelling), where minor differences in the initial conditions can lead to very 
different outcomes the longer the process unfolds. But as suggested by the 
market share liability theory, such a reconceptualisation is not necessarily 
reliant on the scientific ability to establish traditional causality and could also 
be addressed through a normative extension allowing the legally-redefined 
causality link to cover more ground. 
Importantly, the challenges that the Anthropocene poses to the concept 
of sovereignty and the principle of causality also illustrate another wider 																																																								
law that no one is liable for injury he has not been shown to have caused. They said that since Mrs. 
Sorenson could not show that any particular defendant had injured her or even manufactured any 
of the inventum she took, she could recover against none of them.’) 
72  Sindell v. Abbott Labs, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980). 
73  M. A. Geistfeld, ‘The Doctrinal Unity of Alternative Liability and Market-Share Liability’ (2006) 
155 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 447, at 449-452 (discussion conceptions of market-share 
liability as risk-based liability or as a more complex expression of damage/causation based liability) 
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problem that any reconceptualisation attempt is bound to face, namely the 
imbrication of legal concepts. Indeed, legal concepts, and particularly the 
most foundational ones, can only be defined in relation to each other. Taken 
together, their imbrication amounts to a legal ontology, a specific 
representation of reality, as discussed in section 3.3.2. Reconceptualising 
sovereignty or causality is likely to change many other areas of a legal order 
such as the understanding of responsibility/liability which, in turn, is likely 
to change the understanding of duties or obligations (e.g. a new tort based on 
risk has been considered as a corollary of the extension of causality in market-
share liability) as well as of rights (rights of recovery but also of action) which, 
in turn, may also redefine the concept of subject (recognising an obligation 
towards future generations or parts of the environment or granting to these 
entities the right to bring an action would amount to creating at least partial 
subjects of law). Whether the reconceptualisation process starts at one or the 
other end (e.g. whether it starts with the concept of obligation or that of 
subject), the interconnectedness of legal concepts cannot be overlooked.  
From the perspective of this essay, the foregoing examples provide a 
further illustration of the differences between an external logic, which 
currently prevails in the making of environmental law, and the possibility of 
redefining certain foundational legal concepts to ingrain nature within them. 
At the same time, they raise a number of important questions relating to the 
areas of environmental law where the external logic appears insufficient to 
address the challenges of the Anthropocene as well as to the most suitable 
approaches to rise to such challenges. Specifically, one question is whether 
conventional environmental law can be enhanced (I will discuss later in this 
essay the attempts to develop ‘adaptive environmental law’) or whether, at 
least in some areas, a reformulation of foundational legal concepts is 
necessary. To the extent that the latter approach may be explored, particular 
attention should be paid to the imbrications or ‘side-effects’ of different 
reformulations of a foundational concept. 
More clearly reflecting the complexities of nature and the unprecedented 
responsibility of humans are not the only tasks for law in the Anthropocene. 
Neither the responsibility for prompting and sustaining the Anthropocene 
nor the impacts (positive or negative) of the challenges posed by this new 
epoch are spread equally across the entire human race. There are differences 
and inequalities within the apparently homogeneous category of ‘humans’ as 
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a geological force, and they raise a question of distributive justice for which 
law also needs to account.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
ACCOUNTING FOR INEQUALITY 
 
 
 
1. Preliminary observations 
The need to address questions of inequality and redistribution within the 
Anthropocene narrative highlights the fundamental role of social sciences 
and humanities, including law, in understanding our new condition. Indeed, 
natural science accounts of the Anthropocene have been oblivious or 
insufficiently sensitive to what lies beneath an analytical category such as 
‘humankind’ or ‘human systems’ or, still, ‘human agency’. In the attempts at 
developing models that take into account the interactions between natural 
processes and humans, the latter are taken as a single homogeneous variable, 
even by those modelling efforts that seek to provide higher resolution to the 
interactions taking place within the Earth system.74 This difficulty has been 
highlighted in a number of contributions from social scientists, such as those 
of Andreas Malm and Alf Hornborg, 75  Christophe Bonneuil and Jean-
Baptiste Fressoz,76 and Frank Biermann and colleagues.77 
The main tenets of this critique concern: (i) the dominance of natural 
science approaches in the Anthropocene narrative; (ii) the inability of such 
approaches to capture important and even decisive intra-species inequalities 
among humans; (iii) the higher responsibility of early industrialised countries, 
particularly the United Kingdom and the United States, and their elites in 
the advent of the Anthropocene; (iv) the wide diversities in those who have 
benefited from the results of technology and those who have suffered from 																																																								
74  See e.g. the ‘Bretherton Diagram’ where ‘human activities’ are integrated as an additional 
component or cycle of a socio-ecological system (Earth System Science Overview. A Program for Global 
Change, NASA  Science Advisory Committee, 1986, at 19) or newer models with a higher resolution 
of the human variable (F. Berkes, J. Folke, C. Colding (eds.), Navigating Social-Ecological Systems. 
Building Resilience for Complexity and Change (Cambridge University Press, 2003), or E. Bennett, G.D. 
Peterson, L.J. Gordon, ‘Understanding relationships among multiple ecosystem services’ (2009) 
12/12 Ecology Letters1394), all referred to in Bonneuil/Fressoz, above n. 1, at 48-49. 
75  A. Malm, A. Hornborg, ‘The geology of mankind ? A critique of the Anthropocene narrative’ 
(2014) 1/1 The Anthropocene Review 62 
76  See Bonneuil/Fressoz, above n. 1. 
77  See F. Biermann et al, ‘Down to Earth: Contextualizing the Anthropocene’ (2016) 39 Global 
Environmental Change 341 (and the other contributions to this special issue devoted to the 
Anthropocene) 
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their adverse effects; and (v) the implications of not recognising such 
disparities for the attempts at taking action to address the root causes of the 
Anthropocene.  
As with the previous analysis of the disconnection between law and 
nature, it is important to introduce a detour through some social science 
accounts of the Anthropocene, both to identify the implications for law and 
legal analysis and to relate the ensuing legal questions to a wider and 
integrative research agenda encompassing other disciplines.  
2. A finer-grained analysis of the human variable 
The use of ‘humankind’ as an analytical category fails to capture the 
importance of historical contingency in human processes and thereby in the 
impact of humans even at the aggregate level of a geological force. 
Reconnecting conceptually human and natural history calls for different 
levels of analysis, some of which are widely overlooked by the natural science 
approaches to the Anthropocene. At this level, the disconnection between 
natural and human history discussed earlier in this essay is useful to show that 
human agency is not fully determined by natural causes. Human behaviour 
is not fully determined either biologically or environmentally. However, 
introducing elements of historicity and contingency in the Anthropocene 
narrative does not amount to preserving the disconnection, as natural 
processes remain important variables in shaping human agency and, perhaps 
more importantly in this specific context, contingent historical factors may 
be found at the origin of the human processes – the Industrial Revolution – 
that have prompted the Anthropocene. In discussing some examples of 
historical contingencies that have been instrumental in triggering the 
Industrial Revolution, my purpose is to highlight the need for a finer-grained 
approach to the connection between humans and nature in the 
Anthropocene narrative. As I will discuss next, some significant contributions 
to historiography and social science suggest that historical contingency has 
played a major role in shaping the type of ‘world-systems’78  capable of 																																																								
78  For a concise overview of Wallerstein’s analytical approach see I. Wallerstein, World System Analysis : 
An Introduction (Durham NC : Duke University Press, 2004). The full extent of Wallerstein’s theory 
was developed in three main volumes : The Modern World-System, vol. I: Capitalist Agriculture and the 
Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York/London : Academic Press, 
1974) ; The Modern World-System, vol. II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 
1600-1750 (New York/London : Academic Press, 1980) ; The Modern World-System, vol. III: The 
Second Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy, 1730-1840's (San Diego : Academic Press, 
1989). 
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explaining (i) why the Industrial Revolution took off in the United Kingdom 
and Western Europe, and greatly accelerated after the Second World War, 
and (ii) the profound differences among countries in terms of both historical 
responsibility for and exposure to the risks of the Anthropocene. 
One such contribution to the understanding of the origins of the Industrial 
Revolution in the UK and some parts of Western Europe is the study of the 
American historian Kenneth Pomeranz entitled The Great Divergence. 79 
Pomeranz seeks to overcome what he sees as a divide in historical accounts 
of the origins of the Industrial Revolution between two polarised theses, 
where ‘either a Europe-centered world system carrying out essential 
primitive accumulation [of capital] overseas or endogenous European 
growth [are] called upon to explain almost everything’. 80  He adopts a 
comparative method assessing the similar overall conditions prevailing in 
certain areas as late as 1750, particularly England and the Yangzi Delta 
region, as potentially conducive for what became the Industrial Revolution. 
He then asks ‘Why wasn’t England the Yangzi Delta?’ and, conversely ‘Why 
wasn’t the Yangzi Delta England?’81  His detailed and elaborate answer, 
which occupies the remaining of the book, points to two main differences 
between the subsequent paths followed by the two regions, namely the 
fortuitous availability of great reserves of coal in the UK (that could substitute 
for forests) and the ‘natural bounty’ made available through trade flows of 
raw materials against manufactures between the UK and its colonies or 
former colonies (that could largely substitute for land and relied on slavery).  
These two factors made possible a capital and manufacture intensive path, 
with a growing population fed by natural resources from overseas 
grown/extracted by slaves. By contrast, the development of the East Asian 
hinterland retained the resources of these peripheral areas, which were 
therefore not available to fuel a similar trajectory in the Yangzi Delta. As 
noted by Pomeranz: 
‘China’s Lower Yangzi [ … ] had increasing trouble selling enough cloth and importing 
enough food and timber to sustain either proto-industrial growth or the relatively high living 
standards of its workers. This was not because of any internal “flaw” in the region but 
because the areas it had traded with were undergoing their own population and proto-
industrial booms and so were becoming less complementary to it’82 																																																								
79  K. Pomeranz, The Great Divergence : China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World Economy (Princeton 
NJ : Princeton University Press, 2000). 
80  Ibid., at 5. 
81  Ibid., at13 
82  Ibid., at 22. 
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For present purposes, the main question is not whether Pomeranz’s analysis 
provides a more accurate picture of the origins of the Industrial Revolution 
than the other polarised theses that he seeks to overcome. Rather, it is the 
need to resort to historical analysis and look at certain contingencies, such as 
the availability of coal and the asymmetric imperial trade, to explain the 
emergence of the thermo-industrial revolution that prompted the 
Anthropocene. 
In addition, the asymmetry presented by one of these contingencies is of 
critical importance to highlight that it is not the entire humankind that drove 
and benefitted from the industrial processes underpinning the Anthropocene 
but only a highly privileged portion of it, whose location has varied over the 
last two centuries from England and some countries of Western Europe, to 
the United States and Japan as well as some areas of the former Soviet Bloc 
after the Second World War, to China and some other ‘emerging’ economies 
in the last decades. By contrast, large portions of the world population 
suffered from the colonial and post-colonial political asymmetry that enabled 
the Industrial Revolution and the post-1945 Great Acceleration and hardly 
partook in the resulting benefits. To capture such disparities, an analytical 
approach with much higher resolution that the one proposed by the natural 
science narrative of the Anthropocene is required. And such disparities are 
important to understand the Anthropocene not only from the perspective of 
the latter’s impact on different peoples around the world but also because, 
without such disparities, the Industrial Revolution may not have been 
possible. As noted at the beginning of this essay, the legal organisation of 
empires and nation-States as well as of productions processes was part of the 
technologies that prompted the Anthropocene. In an important critique of 
Crutzen’s standard narrative of the Anthropocene, Swedish human 
ecologists Andreas Malm and Alf Hornborg argue that: 
‘uneven distribution [of resources and wealth] is a condition for the very existence of 
modern, fossil-fuel technology [ … ] These technologies are an index of capital 
accumulation, privileged resource consumption, and the displacement of both work and 
environmental loads. After more than 20 years, we still tend to imagine “technological 
progress” as nothing but the magic wand of ingenuity which, with no necessary political or 
moral implications elsewhere, will solve our local problems of sustainability’83 
Critical accounts of the dynamics of the Industrial Revolution, particularly 
of the inequalities on which it relied, raise the wider question of the origins 
and workings of capitalism. However polemic, such accounts provide 																																																								
83  Malm/Hornborg, above n. 75, at 64. 
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powerful analytical tools to understand human agency leading to the 
Anthropocene and, more specifically, the role of law within it.  
The work of American sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein on ‘world-
system analysis’84  is particularly illuminating in this regard because it is 
capable of linking a given organisation of a world-system, such as the UK-
dominated one that prevailed from the late XVIII to the beginning of the 
XX century, with an ensuing social and ecological footprint. Bonneuil and 
Fressoz review several contributions that, relying on the concept of world-
systems, have tried to clarify the ecological implications of different 
production systems, particularly during the British-led Industrial Revolution 
and the US-led Great Acceleration. 85  This ecological footprint can be 
calculated by reference to concepts such as ‘ghost or incorporated hectares’ 
(i.e. the number of hectares necessary to produce a given good or raw 
material) or ‘ecological unequal exchange’ (i.e. exchanges of goods that 
require far less land or have a far lower ecological footprint against goods 
with far higher land requirements or ecological footprints). By way of 
illustration, Hornborg has estimated that, in 1850, an exchange of £1000 of 
textile manufactured in Manchester against £1000 of cotton produced in the 
US was highly unequal in ecological terms because the US cotton required 
6000 times more land than the English goods. 86  A similar estimation 
concerns the increasing UK net imports of biomass, which were multiplied 
by a factor of six over the period from 1855 to 1930.87  The ecological 
footprint of the Great Acceleration is also immense and highly uneven. In a 
study published in 2014,88 a group of Austrian scientists showed that since 																																																								
84  See above n. 78. 
85  Bonneuil/Fressoz, above n. 1, chapter 10, referring a number of interdisciplinary studies: H. 
Schandl, N. Schulz, ‘Changes in the United Kingdom’s natural relations in terms of society’s 
metabolism and land-use from 1850 to the present day’ (2002) 41 Ecological Economics 203; A. 
Hornborg, C. L. Crumley (ed.), The World System and the Earth System (Walnut Creek CA: Left Coast 
Press, 2006); M. Fischer-Kowalski, H. Haberl (eds.), Socioecological Transitions and Global Change: 
Trajectories of Social Metabolism and Land Use (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007); J. B. Foster, B. 
Clark, ‘Ecological imperialism and the global metabolic rift: Unequal exchange and the 
guano/nitrates trade’ (2009) 50 International Journal of Comparative Sociology 311; J. B. Foster, B. Clark, 
R. York, The Ecological Rift. Capitalism War on the Earth (Monthly Review Press, 2010); A. Hornborg, 
Global Ecology and Unequal Exchange. Fetishism in a Zero-Sum World (London: Routledge, 2013); A. 
Hornborg, ‘Ecological economics, Marxism, and technological progress: Some explorations of the 
conceptual foundations of theories of ecological unequal exchange’ (2014) 105 Ecological Economics 
11; J. B. Foster, H. Holleman, ‘The theory of unequal ecological exchange: A Marx-Odum 
dialectic’ (2014) 41 Journal of Peasant Studies 199; J. W. Moore, Capitalism in the Web of Life (London: 
Verso, 2015); A. Malm, Fossil Capital. The Rise of Steam-Power and the Roots of Global Warming (London: 
Verso, 2016). 
86  Hornborg 2013, above n. 85, at 85-91. 
87  Schandl/Schulz, above n. 85, at 215. 
88  A. Schaffartzik et al, ‘The global metabolic transition : Regional patterns and trends of global 
material flows, 1950-2010’ (2014) 26 Global Environmental Change 87. 
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the 1950s, global material consumption (an aggregate variable of all 
materials processed in an economy, except for water and air, including 
biomass, fossil energy resources, metals, industrial minerals, construction 
minerals, and other traded products) has increased faster (by a factor of 3.7) 
than population (by a factor of 2.7). The distribution of this increase, both in 
the aggregate and in per capita measures, clearly shows striking levels of 
inequality in the consumption/use of such materials. Up to 1990, the West 
and the Soviet block amounted together to over 50% of globally extracted 
materials. Over the period 1950-2010, annual per capita consumption in the 
West was three times (14.8 tonnes) that in Sub-Saharan Africa (4.8 tonnes). 
Starting in 2000, Asia (particularly China) overtook the West in its global 
share of resource use, although not in per capita terms.  
These are but some measures of inequality relevant for the assessment of 
the relative ecological footprint of countries, groups of countries, and 
populations. But they clearly convey the message that inequality is deeply 
present in human agency, and that using ‘humankind’ as an aggregate 
variable is not only unfair but also inaccurate. 
3. Law and inequality in the Anthropocene 
3.1. Overview 
A number of legal developments enabled or facilitated the industrial 
trajectory of the different hegemons and beneficiaries of world-systems, to 
adopt the terminology of Wallerstein. 
In addition to the oft-cited consolidation of unified management, limited 
liability and share tradability as a major advantages of new business 
organisations,89 the legal questions relevant for the understanding of these 
trajectories would include the protection of the assets of companies against 
																																																								
89  On the origins of industrial corporations see: S. Williston, ‘History of the Law of Business 
Corporations before 1800’ (1888) 2/3-4 Harvard Law Review 105 (part 1), 149 (part 2); A. Berle, G. 
Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: Macmillan, 1932) (classic account of 
the foundations of corporate law stressing the separation between ownership and control of 
corporate affairs) ; R. E. Seavoy, The origins of the American business corporation 1784-1855 (Westport, 
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982) (paying particular attention to corporate law in New York) ; W. 
G. Roy, Socialising Capital : The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation in America (Princeton NJ : 
Princeton University Press, 1997) (analysing the quasi-public origins of major corporations) ; T. 
W. Guinnane et al, ‘Pouvoir et proprieté dans l’entreprise: Pour une histoire international des 
sociétés à responsabilité limitée’ (2008) 63/1 Annales. Histoire. Sciences Sociales 73 (arguing that the 
diffusion of the corporation as a form of business organization has been overestimated, and 
focusing on other forms of limited liability organisations in France, Germany, the UK and the US). 
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the creditors of shareholders,90 the legal organisation of labour relations,91 
the accommodation through compensation of the impacts of industrial 
processes,92 and more generally an international legal order allowing for the 
threat or the use of force,93 downplaying the validity of the territorial title of 
non-European political entities94 (with some exceptions, particularly in the 
Americas), enabling colonial exploitation of natural resources and, later on, 
enabling access to natural resources located abroad as well as to markets for 
manufactured products.95 
Given space and my own limitations, it would be impossible to cover, even 
superficially, all these areas of law and their role in prompting and sustaining 
the industrial processes characterising the Anthropocene. Instead, my 
purpose in the following sections is to identify three sets of questions that I 
see as potentially useful directions for legal research into the arrangements 
underpinning the trajectories and disparities discussed in the previous 
section. These three sets include questions relating to the legal organisation 
of production processes (business organisation, labour relations, impacts on 																																																								
90  See e.g. H. Hansmann, R. Kraakman, R. Squire, ‘Law and the Rise of the Firm’ (2005/2006) 119 
Harvard Law Review 1335. 
91  See e.g. O. Kahn-Freund, ‘Legal Framework’, in A. Flanders, H. A. Clegg (eds.), The System of 
Industrial Relations in Great Britain: its History, Law and Institutions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1954), pp. 42-
127; O. Kahn-Freund, Labour Relations: Heritage and Adjustment (Oxford University Press, 1979); M. 
Linder, The Employment Relationship in Anglo-American Law: A Historical Perspective (New York: 
Greenwood, 1989); J. Le Goff, Du silence à la parole. Une histoire du droit du travail des années 1830 à nos 
jours (Rennes : Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2004) ; A. Supiot, Critique du droit du travail (Paris : 
Presses universitaires de France, 2007). 
92  See e.g. J. F. Brenner, ‘Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution’ (1974) 3/2 Journal of Legal 
Studies 403 ; A. E. Dingle, ‘The Monster Nuisance of All. Landowners, Alkali Manufacturers, and 
Air Pollution, 1828-1864’ (1982) 35/4 Economic History Review 529; B. Pontin, ‘Tort Law and 
Victorian Governement Growth: the historiographical significance of tort law in the shadow of 
chemical pollution’ (1998) 18/4 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 661; G. Massard-Guilbaud, Histoire de 
la pollution industrielle en France, 1789-1914 (Paris : EHESS, 2010) ; J.-B. Fressoz, ‘Payer pour polluer : 
l’industrie chimique et la compensation des dommages environnementaux, 1800-1850’ (2013) 
28/1 Histoire & mesure 145. 
93  See e.g. I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 
chapter 2 (focusing on the period between 1815 and 1914). 
94  In his discussion of the Berlin Conference on the partition of Africa, John Westlake, the then 
Whewell Professor of International Law at Cambridge, noted that ‘it would be going much further, 
and to a length to which declined to go, if we were to say that, except in the case of unprovoked 
aggression justifying conquest, an uncivilized population has rights which makes its free consent 
necessary to the establishment over it of a government possessing international validity [ … ] Those 
arrangements [the Berlin act] are not to be construed as denying, because they do not affirm them, 
the rights of any who are not stipulating parties to the conventions by which they are made. The 
moral rights of all outside the international society against the several members of that society 
remain intact though they have not and scarcely could have been converted into legal rights’, 
Chapters on the Principles of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 1894), at 139-140. 
95  See A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 
2004), pp. 141-162 (discussing the level of priority accorded by colonial powers to the resources of 
the colonies and, after the First World War, in the context of the mandate system established by 
the League of Nations, the discoursive emphasis on developing such resources both for the local 
populations but, in practice, mostly for the benefit of ‘the Commerce of the World’). 
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third parties) (3.2) and of asymmetric international exchange systems 
(colonial and post-colonial) (3.3.), as well as the legal expressions given to 
disparities in historical responsibilities within humankind (as regards 
reparation for past damages, the representation of future generations, and 
the contemporary distribution of the benefits/burden of taking action) (3.4.). 
3.2. Legal organisation of production 
3.2.1. Organising production for the Industrial Revolution 
The legal organisation of production processes relies heavily (albeit not 
entirely) on three bodies of norms, namely those structuring the form of 
business ventures, those addressing the situation of the workforce, and those 
dealing with the impacts of industrial processes on third parties. In reviewing 
the development of these bodies of law, a common feature is the priority 
given to the organisation of production over its adverse effects. Even the 
regulation of industrial emissions, which seems specifically targeted to such 
impacts, focused largely on the reparation of injury suffered by third parties 
rather than on the banning or structuring of the regulated activities. It is only 
in recent times, particularly in the second half of the XX, that the centre of 
gravity of law shifted to the reduction of the harm through preventive 
techniques.  
Yet, the desirability of the industrial processes (e.g. chemical industries or 
electricity production) remained the driving assumption and the limitations 
on their operation, however hard fought, took the form of either an 
additional layer of norms dealing with the protection of social rights, affected 
populations or the environment (see sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4) or, increasingly, 
they were shaped as ‘regulation’, understood as technical standards aimed at 
fine-tuning and optimising the operation of a (productive) system.96 
3.2.2. The law of business organisation 
The law of business organisation experienced significant change starting in 
the XIX century in both the UK97 and the US,98 but also in other countries 
benefiting from the ‘world-systems’ established by the hegemon (e.g. 																																																								
96  For the distinction between ‘regulation’, in the meaning of self-adjustment or optimization, and 
‘règlementation’, understood as the attempt at governing reality in such a way that it pursues certain 
values, see Supiot, above n. 91, pp. X-XIII. 
97  See Companies Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 89). On the process that led to this statute see P. L. 
Cottrel, Industrial Finance 1830-1914. The finance and organization of the English manufacturing industry 
(London : Routledge, 1980), chapter 3. 
98  See Seavoy, above n. 89 (referring to the law of business organisation in New York) 
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Germany99 or France100). Depending on the level of analysis, the trajectories 
defined by the law of business organisation and their impact vary from one 
account to the other. Overall, however, it seems clear that the processes 
unleashed by the Industrial Revolution were enabled by laws providing 
certain basic features, such as limited liability (whether provided by a 
corporate form or by another form of business organisation101), unified and 
separate management, tradability of shares and some protections against 
liquidation of the business entity, whether against the very owners of the 
entity (or their successors102) or against their creditors.103  
Importantly, a major factor driving the emergence and development of 
these legal entities was the need to commit the significant amounts of capital 
required by industrial and infrastructure projects and the idea of setting up 
‘chartered’ entities was modelled on earlier State-sponsored entities used to 
pursue colonial interests (e.g. England’s East India Company) and/or to 
manage public monopolies. 104  The economic importance of these new 
business organisations is well known and does not call for much additional 
comment. I should add, however, that until quite recently – at least when 
one considers the history of the Industrial Revolution – the ‘social 
responsibility’ of corporations was still understood as the mere maximisation 
of their profits.105  
The emergence of corporate social responsibility standards106  has not 
changed this picture fundamentally as such standards, to the extent they are 
indeed implemented, are rarely a driver of the business organisation of a 
																																																								
99  Aktiennovelle von 1870 (or New Company Act 1870), which was an amendment of the 1861 Allgemeines 
Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch, which was further reformed in 1884.  See N. Horn, ‘Aktienrechtliche 
Unternehmensorganisation in der Hochindustrialisierung (1860-1920)’, in N. Horn, J. Kocka 
(eds.), Recht und Entwicklung der Grossunternehmen im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert: wirtschafts-, sozial- und 
rechtshistorische Untersuchungen zur Industrialisierung in Deutschland, Frankreich, England und den USA 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979), pp. 123-189. 
100  Loi du 24 juillet 1867 sur les sociétés commerciales. On the process leading to this statute see C. E. 
Freedeman, Joint-stock enterprise in France, 1807-1867 : From privileged company to modern corporation 
(Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina Press, 1970). 
101  See Guinnane et al, above n. 89. 
102  See M. M. Blair, ‘Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in 
the Nineteenth Century’ (2003) 51 UCLA Law Review 387. 
103  See Hansmann et al, above n. 90. 
104  See Hansmann et al, above n. 90, at 1377 (referring to Holdsworth and Williston) ; Roy, above n. 
89. 
105  In the early 1960s, Milton Friedman famously wrote that the corporate responsibility of business 
was merely to increase its profits. See M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago IL: University 
of Chicago Press, 1962), at 155.  
106  See A. B. Carroll, ‘A History of Corporate Social Responsibility: Concepts and Practices’, in A. 
Crane et al (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 
2008), pp. 19-45. 
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venture.107 Rather, they operate as (normally non-binding) limitations setting 
some broad outer limits (regarding human rights, social rights, 
environmental protection, corruption, etc.) for business action, much in the 
same way as the two other areas of law to which I now turn, namely labour 
relations and impact on third parties. 
3.2.3. Structuring labour relations 
Labour relations in Britain remained largely unaddressed by statute law until 
the second half of the XX century. Until the 1960s and 1970s, labour 
relations were governed essentially by employers and trade unions in what 
O. Kahn-Freund, a prominent labour lawyer, called ‘collective laissez-
faire’.108  
The emergence of this governance approach was hard fought,109 as for 
most of the XIX century, trade unions had to face hostile common law courts 
that considered their aims and action as contrary to economic freedoms (the 
doctrine of restraint of trade) and exposed strike organisers to potential 
liability on the basis of several economic torts (conspiracy, inducing breach 
of contract, interfering with trade or business).110 As late as 1901, in the Taff 
Vale case, the House of Lords expressed the view that trade unions could be 
directly sued in tort and held liable for the acts of their officials.111 In this 
tense context, the framework for self-regulation was introduced through 
subsequent statutory interventions in 1871 and 1906 under which trade 
unions and strike organisers were shielded from the doctrine of restraint of 
trade and common law economic torts.  
In the United States, in the late XIX and early XX century, worker 
movements faced similar resistance from the judiciary, on the basis of 
criminal conspiracy charges or through the use of labour injunctions.112 After 
the Great Depression, however, the loss of confidence in business leaders and 																																																								
107  The external dimension of corporate social responsibility, as an additional layer overimposed on 
‘normal’ business operations, can be contrasted with the focus on social development as an integral 
dimension of so-called ‘social entrepreneurship’. See e.g. A. Nicholls (ed.), Social Entrepreneurship. 
New Models of Sustainable Social Change (Oxford University Press, 2006) and, for an exposition of the 
principles underlying a prominent example, see M. Yunus, K. Weber, Building Social Business (New 
York: Public Affairs, 2010) (relying on the experience gained by Yunus’ founded Grameen bank). 
108  Kahn-Freund (1954), above n. 91. 
109  For a vivid account of the history of trade unions in Britain see A. Reid, United We Stand. A History 
of Britain’s Trade Unions (London: Penguin, 2005). 
110  A. C. L. Davies, Perspectives on Labour Law (Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn. 2009), at 4.  
111  Taff Vale Railway Co v Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants [1901] AC 426 (HL), referred to in idem. 
112  For a concise account see W. E. Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991). 
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courts as well as the massive protests staged by farmers and workers led to a 
series of statutory interventions, above all the National Labor Relations Act 
of 1935 (NLRA), which legitimised the use of collective bargaining.113  
In both countries, economic freedoms were initially and for more than a 
century used to sustain the asymmetric relation of power, subjecting workers 
to employers. Economic torts were interpreted in such a way as if worker 
mobilisation could only hurt employers and national prosperity, overlooking 
the very reasons why workers mobilised in the first place. In the United 
States, at the turn from the XIX to the XX century, this tension had 
crystallised into competing interpretations of the Thirteenth Amendment. 
Workers saw themselves as subject to a condition of ‘involuntary servitude’ 
whereas courts asserted that the Thirteenth Amendment only protected the 
individual right to resign free from physical coercion.114 This tension recalls 
the darker origins of the asymmetry sustained by law, namely slavery, and it 
connects the stories of the US and the UK in that, as argued by K. Pomeranz, 
the latter was able to overcome the land constraint and move into the 
Industrial Revolution as a result of slave-grown farm exports from 
plantations in the Caribbean, the Southern parts of the US and North-
eastern Brazil.115  
3.2.4. Pollution and third parties 
The law-enabled asymmetry is also noticeable in the relations between 
producers and third parties affected by what we call today negative 
externalities, such as pollution. A number of historical studies116 have shown 
that the legal framework introduced some oversight of industrial operations 
but that the thrust of the system was to provide a right of compensation to 
directly affected third parties, with no regard for the environment as such or 
future generations. The latter point seems natural, as concern for the 
environment and future generations did not arise until the second half of the 
XX century. However, it shows that the relevant laws took as their starting-
point that industrial production could not have effects beyond contemporary 																																																								
113  See J. Pope, ‘Worker Lawmaking, Sit-Down Strikes, and the Shaping of American Industrial 
Relations, 1935-1958’ (2006) 24/1 Law & History Review 45. 
114  See J. Pope, ‘Contract, Race and Freedom of Labor in the Constitutional Law of ‘Involuntary 
Servitude’’ (2010) 119 Yale Law Journal 1474. 
115  Pomeranz, above n. 79, at 264. For a history of the Atlantic slave trade covering the relevant period 
see  H. Thomas, The Slave Trade: The Story of the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1440-1870 (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 1997). 
116  See above n. 92 the studies by Brenner (1974) ; Dingle (1982) ; Pontin (1998) ; Massard-Guilbaud 
(2010) ; Fressoz (2013).  
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humans (as noted by H. Jonas with respect to ethics) and, even among them, 
the prevailing approach was not to prevent, let alone block polluting 
activities, but to allow them subject to certain duties of compensation for their 
adverse impacts. 
In an early contribution to the understanding of the (limited) role of 
nuisance law in the Industrial Revolution, J. Brenner argues that:  
‘the main explanation of the irrelevance of nuisance to industrialization lies not in the 
doctrine itself but rather in the fact that it was not applied precisely to those classes of parties 
who were most responsible for economic growth and pollution’.117 
More specifically, relying on the case law of mid XIX century England, 
Brenner shows that nuisance law was applied differently to individuals and 
factories, and hardly applied at all to quasi-public (chartered) enterprises, and 
that, in all events, there was no systematic prosecution of public nuisances.  
Even after the Alkali Act was adopted in 1863, placing the property of 
manufacturers under State oversight in order to protect the property of (large 
and wealthy) landowners,118 the system of the Act soon became – and came 
to be seen – as a case of what today would be called regulatory capture, with 
very few prosecutions of alkali manufacturers. 119  In point of fact, 
manufacturers were generally favourable to the introduction of the Alkali 
Act, partly because they believed that cooperation would allow them to 
prevent more intrusive regulatory approaches such as the one followed in 
France, which dictated the location of a manufacture on the basis of its level 
of impact. Yet, even in France, the 1810 Décret sur les établissements classés was 
applied in a way that was highly accommodating for industrial activities120 
and the analysis of the private law case law of the time shows that the main 
approach was to compensate financially the damages suffered by third 
parties, and not to hinder industrial operations.121  
Since the early days of the Industrial Revolution, legal controls over 
pollution have undergone fundamental changes, both from the perspective 
of regulatory oversight and private litigation. By and large, however, the 
conceptual underpinnings of the control systems are still shaped by the idea 
that production is to be organised first and then limitations added to deal 
with externalities. In other words, as noted earlier in this essay, 
environmental protection has still to become part of the DNA of law, 																																																								
117  Brenner, above n. 92, at 408 ; Dingle, above n. 92, at 537-538. 
118  Dingle, above n. 92, at 529-530. 
119  Ibid, at 545. 
120  See generally Massard-Guilbaud (2010), above n. 92. 
121  Fressoz, above n. 92, at 146. 
J. E. Viñuales  In Our Hands? 
_________________________________________________________________________________	
	 48 
including in those areas that organise production processes both domestically 
and internationally.  
3.3. Asymmetric international exchange systems 
3.3.1. The British Atlantic system 
An important aspect in Pomeranz’s explanation of the origins of the 
Industrial Revolution in England is, as already noted, reliance on raw 
materials from the Americas, Brazil and the Caribbean. Pomeranz shows 
that the purchase of English manufactures consumed most of the income 
received by these dependencies from the exports of sugar, corn or cotton, 
and that the labour for the production of such raw materials relied very 
heavily on slave trade.122  
Trade had already become a concern of empire ideologists in the late 
XVII and early XVIII century.123 David Armitage, a British historian, notes 
that by the mid XVIII century the Anglophone inhabitants of the British-
shaped Atlantic world had started to describe their community 
(encompassing the UK, its Caribbean and North-American possessions, and 
to some extent African and the East Indies) as the ‘British Empire’.124 He 
quotes a contemporary writing by Malachy Postlethwayt on The African Trade, 
the Great Pillar and Support of the British Plantation Trade in America (London, 1745), 
according to which: ‘the General Navigation of Great Britain owes all its 
Encrease and Splendor to the Commerce of its American and African 
Colonies’.125  
The domestic and international law of the time was instrumental in 
enabling the flows of slaves from Africa and the unequal exchange of 
manufactured goods from England against raw materials from the colonies 
and later the new world. Several aspects would have to be covered, including 
the lawfulness, until the early XIX century (and in some areas much later) of 
slavery, the laws regulating the freedom of the seas, and those organising 
market access and trade. In what follows, I briefly discuss the latter as it 
concerns the British Empire and the post-1945 world trade system.  
3.3.2. The legal organisation of trade 																																																								
122  See Pomeranz, above n. 79, chapter 6. 
123  See D. Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 
147-148. 
124  Ibid., at 171. 
125  Idem. 
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Initially, the approach pursued was a mercantilist one126  shaped by the 
Navigation Acts of 1660, 1663, 1670 and 1673 whereby the trade relations 
of the British colonies were tightly regulated to prevent them from trading 
with other European powers – particularly the Dutch – and their colonies.127 
But as the industrial processes that characterised the Industrial Revolution 
unravelled, and the manufacturing sector’s political influence grew stronger, 
a movement towards tariff reduction and free trade, first on a reciprocal basis 
and then unilaterally, gained ground in the UK. The analysis of the transition 
must necessarily be nuanced and integrate different levels,128 including a 
diversity of political interests for and against trade liberalisation, the 
perceptions (whether justified or not empirically) of the advantages of free 
trade, and the international context. This movement culminated with the 
repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 and later with a network of over fifty 
bilateral trade treaties that followed the conclusion of the Cobden-Chevalier 
treaty of 1860 between the UK and France.129  
By the end of the XIX century, however, the market dominance on which 
the UK free trade approach relied for its expected success was challenged by 
a series of international developments, including highly protectionist policies 
in the US and Europe (e.g. France, Germany, Italy) shielding the agricultural 
and the industrial sector,130 often to protect ‘infant industries’ that would 
later become major competitors of the UK’s manufacturing sector. There 
has been significant debate as to whether the rise of protectionism in the late 
XIX century enabled growth in Europe and the Americas. The debate 
focuses mostly on explaining the observed positive correlation between trade 
protectionism and growth,131 and it is of relevance to situate the evolution of 																																																								
126  Ibid., pp. 166-167 (discussing the views of three influential analysts of trade, namely Josiah Child, 
Charles Davenant, and William Wood). 
127  See G. M. Walton, ‘The New Economic History and the Burdens of the Navigation Acts’ (1971) 
24/4 Economic History Review 533 (comparing three attempts at assessing the impact of the British 
trade system on the American colonies). 
128  The repeal of the Corn Laws paving the way for British free trade policies has been described as a 
‘puzzle’, which has not yet been adequately explained. See C. Schonhardt-Bailey, From the Corn 
Laws to Free Trade: Interests, Ideas and Institutions in Historical Perspective (Cambridge MA : MIT Press, 
2006), at 1. The same author published a comprehensive four volume documentary history 
covering the XIX century: C. Schonhardt-Bailey (ed.), The Rise of Free Trade (London: Routledge, 
1997). 
129  See M. Lampe, ‘Explaining nineteenth-century bilateralism: economic and political determinants 
of the Cobden–Chevalier network’ (2011) 64/2 Economic History Review 644 (explaining different 
drivers of the emergence of this treaty network). 
130  See generally P. Bairoch (1989). `European trade policy, 1815-1914.', in P. Mathias and S. Pollard 
(eds), The Cambridge Economic History of Europe (Cambridge University Press, 1989), vol. 8, pp. 1-160 
(highlighting the link between protectionism and growth) 
131  For an overview see K. H. O’Rourke, ‘Tariffs and Growth in the Late 19th Century’ (2000) 110 
The Economic Journal 456. 
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international trade policy in the context of the two features of the 
Anthropocene highlighted in this essay, i.e. growth and inequality, and why 
law matters for them. The First World War and the inter-war period were 
characterised by extremely protectionist and opportunistic trade practices 
(so-called ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policies) centred on imperial blocks. Some 
explanations for the enactment of these policies in countries such as the UK, 
Germany and Japan (but not the US) point to the strong pressure from 
domestic manufacturers who faced increasing international competition and, 
unlike manufacturers in the US, had only small domestic markets to invest 
in major capacity enhancement.132  Imperial protection offered a way of 
expanding the market while excluding competition.  
The multilateral trade system established in the aftermath of the Second 
World War around the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT)133 and the failed International Trade Organisation (ITO)134 sought 
to avoid precisely this type of inward policies, which were considered to have 
contributed to the outbreak of the war. But in establishing basic standards of 
trade liberalisation across the board, such as the most-favoured-nation and 
national treatment clauses and the progressive reduction of trade tariffs 
through negotiation rounds, it also introduced a significant element of de facto 
inequality, as many countries could not compete in international trade 
markets. Interestingly, the very de facto discrimination (i.e. discrimination that 
results not from the face of the measure but from its actual application or the 
empirical conditions to which it applies) that the non-discrimination 
standards of the GATT seek to avoid among products is, to some extent, 
inherent to the general application of such standards to all countries, where 
very different initial conditions prevailed. Very soon, the de facto advantages 
provided by the world trade system to certain countries were challenged and 
several development countries together with a wave of newly independent 
countries emerging from the decolonisation process called for differential 
application of trade rules. These claims led to the creation of the United 
Nations Conference for International Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
																																																								
132  See K. A. Chase, ‘Imperial protection and strategic trade policy in the interwar period’ (2004) 
11/1 Review of International Political Economy 177. 
133  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 30 October1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. 
134  Havana Charter for an International Trade Organisation, 24 March 1948, UN Doc. E/Conf. 
2178. 
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in 1964 135  to promote development matters in international trade 
negotiations.  
However, the UNCTAD has faced great competition from other 
organisations focusing on growth and trade, such as the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which emerged from 
the post-war Marshall Plan, and above all the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) established in 1994.136 Matters of inequality remain prominent in the 
more recent green industrial policies required to effect the transition to a low 
carbon economy. 137  Protectionist policies, even when they seek the 
protection of an environmental infant industry (e.g. renewable energy) have 
been challenged as breaches of non-discrimination standards (see section 
5.3.3 below). It is no exaggeration to say that, under current trade rules, 
environmental protection measures can be lawfully adopted only to the 
extent that they are consistent with trade liberalisation.138  
Viewed from the perspective of the Anthropocene narrative, this 
conclusion amounts to a confirmation of what was suggested earlier in this 
essay, namely that legal institutions are built in such a way that socio-
economic growth/development is organised first and only then 
environmental protection concerns are added, as external and additional. 
More fundamentally, the growth/development system entrenched in legal 
institutions favours those countries that were already competitive when the 
new standards came into play, and they may become means to thwart or 
delay transition to a new socio-technical regime (see below section 5.2). In 
short, the inequalities in the production processes and prosperity that have 
led to the Anthropocene can also be read in past and existing legal 
institutions. 
3.4. Operationalising historical responsibility 
3.4.1. Level and time-horizon 
An important question is whether law can reflect the different historical 
inequalities and responsibilities of different human groups for the advent of 
the Anthropocene and, if so, through which means and approaches. As with 																																																								
135  See United Nations Conference for Trade and Development, UNCTAD at 50 : A Short History 
(Geneva : United Nations, 2014). 
136  Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation, 15 April 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154. 
137  See e.g. United Nations Environment Programme/International Institute for Sustainable 
Development, Trade and the Green Economy. A Handbook (third edn. 2014), at 1. 
138  See P.-M. Dupuy, J. E. Viñuales, International Environmental Law (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 
at 400. 
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previous questions, the range of legal concepts potentially relevant is wide. 
They include the bodies of law specifically developed to allocate 
responsibility for environmental action (e.g. allocation of regulatory 
responsibility)139 and damage (responsibility/liability/compensation)140 but 
also those governing access to justice141  and the organisation of redress 
processes, 142  and even foundational concepts such as those of legal 
personality, representation, obligation, debt, causality or damage.  
In order to provide a meaningful structure to the inquiry, two analytical 
clarifications appear useful. Firstly, although the reference to historical 
responsibility does not necessarily exclude individual liability or individual 
damage, I will situate my inquiry at a broader level capable of reflecting the 
magnitude entailed in the term ‘historical’. I do not mean that an individual’s 
action or his/her suffering may never reach historical proportions, as Hitler’s 
monstrous decision to trigger a genocide or, conversely, Mandela’s heroic 
decision to peacefully tolerate long years of prison certainly did. But the 
concepts capable of reflecting the historical responsibility for the 
Anthropocene would have to refer to the action or suffering of more 
aggregate entities, such as future generations, or slaves, or oppressed peoples, 
or small island nations, or certain non-human species. Secondly, the time 
direction implicit in legal approaches is also important. Some of them (e.g. 
historical debt or mass redress mechanisms) look mainly at the past, whereas 
some others (e.g. representation of future generations) are more forward-
looking. Between the two, the allocation of responsibility for action among 
contemporaneous actors provides a basis to organise present action (whether 
such action is mainly backward- or forward-looking).  
With these two clarifications in mind, the purpose of this section is to 
survey three ways of fleshing out legally the historical responsibilities arising 
from the advent of the Anthropocene, namely historical redress processes 
(3.4.2), the legal recognition of future generations (3.4.3), and the allocation 
of responsibility for present action (3.4.4). 																																																								
139  For an example of this broad question in a specific regulatory context see J. van Zeben, The 
Allocation of Regulatory Competence in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (Cambridge University Press, 
2014). 
140  For a comparative study see M. Hinteregger (ed.), Environmental Liability and Ecological Damage in 
European Law (Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
141  See the seminal study by C. Stone, ‘Should Trees have Standing? Towards Legal Rights for 
Natural Objects ’ (1972) 45 California Law Review 450.    
142  For two studies focusing on different areas of redress see P. de Greif (ed.), The Handbook of Reparations 
(Oxford University Press, 2008) ; H. Holtzmann, E. Kristjánsdóttir (eds.), International Mass Claims 
Processes (Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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3.4.2. Industrialisation and the historical debt towards Africans 
I have already mentioned the important advantage offered by the slave trade 
in the advent of the Industrial Revolution in England at the beginning of the 
XIX century. The same considerations could be extended to native peoples 
in the Americas as well as to other oppressed groups, whose labour and 
resources were instrumental in the economic equation that, according to 
Pomeranz, enabled the Industrial Revolution. From a legal perspective, two 
main approaches have been followed to address such past injustices. One 
concerns the normative concepts grounding the need for redress, such as the 
concepts of ‘debt’, ‘responsibility’ or ‘obligation’. The other focuses on the 
actual redress mechanisms, whether in the context of mass property claims 
or transitional justice. Unsurprisingly, the operational nature of the second 
approach makes it relatively more effective (albeit often controversial and 
highly criticised) than the first approach. Yet, redress mechanisms would 
normally rely on a prior allocation of responsibility. Depending on the 
circumstances of the case, such allocation is softened by a variety of 
‘restorative justice’ tools that seek to make up for the victims suffering without 
incriminating – at least fully – their victimisers, at least when the latter still 
wield sufficient power to interfere with the transition. 
The close connection between the concepts used to translate injustice into 
responsibility and the redress mechanisms that may be used at an operational 
level can be illustrated by reference to a debate concerning the historical 
responsibility of the West for the African slave trade. In a special issue of the 
journal African Studies Quarterly, a number of contributions addressed redress 
options ranging from the creation of a tribunal143  (based on the idea of 
criminal responsibility) to compensation for the African contribution to the 
development of Europe 144  (based on considerations akin to unjust 
enrichment) to the development of an African Marshall Plan145 (relying on a 
restorative – rather than punitive – justice approach). Of particular interest 
is A. Mazrui’s contribution, which is based on an earlier and more developed 
study published in 1994 in the African Studies Review and based on his 
																																																								
143  Ricardo Laremont, ‘Political versus Legal Strategies for the African Slavery Reparations 
Movement’ (1999) 2/4 African Studies Quarterly 13. 
144  Ali Mazrui, ‘From Slave Ship to Space Ship : Africa between Marginalization and Globalization’ 
(1999) 2/4 African Studies Quarterly 5. 
145  D. Thomson, ‘The Debt Has Not Been Paid, the Accounts Have Not Been Settled’ (1999) 2/4 
African Studies Quarterly 19 (Thomson derives the idea of a Marshall plan for Africa from previous 
proposals, including from Mazrui) 
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inaugural Bashroun M.K.O. Abiola Distinguished Lecture.146 Writing in the 
context of what he saw as the emerging ‘Reparationist’ movement, fostered 
by a resolution adopted by the Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.) in 
1993 and calling for the compensation of a ‘unique and unprecedented moral 
debt owed to the African peoples which has yet to be paid’,147 Mazrui asks 
whether ‘the restitution [should] be calculated on the basis of the pain of the 
slave or the profit of the slaver’.148 He reasons that both have to be taken into 
account and refers, specifically, to the ‘era of the labor imperative [ … ] when 
the West was interested primarily in African labor- and was prepared to 
promote slave raids, the Middle Passage and slave plantations to ensure that 
kind of exploitation of African labor.’149 Referring to this era, Mazrui’s 1999 
article expounds the same relation between slave trade and the Industrial 
Revolution as the one discussed by Pomeranz, whereby: 
‘labor of Africa's sons and daughters was what the West needed for its industrial take-off. 
The slave ship helped to export millions to the Americas to help in the agrarian revolution 
in the Americas and the industrial revolution in Europe simultaneously’150 
This is not the only basis Mazrui sees for reparation, as the imperialist powers 
also benefited from African lands and natural resources, but the key 
consideration here is that the historical debt rests both on historical/ongoing 
damage to Africa and on a form of unjust enrichment, the extreme form of 
which was the economic compensation received by slavers for the 
emancipation of slaves. The redress mechanisms would have to reflect these 
different bases and involve not only monetary transfers but also 
empowerment strategies of Africans with respect to their own State machines 
as well as with respect to the World. 
One specific attempt at claiming such reparation was made in the 
conclusions of the African World Reparation and Repatriation Truth 
Commission that met in Accra, Ghana, in August 1999 and asked ‘the West’ 
to pay 777 trillion to Africa within a period of five years as reparation for the 
slave trade. 151  This initiative, influenced by the transitional process 																																																								
146  A. Mazrui, ‘Global Africa: From Abolitionists to Reparationists’ (1994) 37/3 African Studies Review 
1. 
147  ‘The Abuja Proclamation’, Declaration of the first Abuja Pan-African Conference on Reparations 
for African Enslavement, Colonization and Neo-Colonization, sponsored by The Organization of 
African Unity and its Reparations Commission April 27-29, 1993, Abuja, Nigeria.  
148  Mazrui, above n. 146, at 8. 
149  Ibid., at 9 (referring to J. H. Clarke’s African People in World History, Baltimore: Black Classic Press, 
1993, pp. 51-71)  
150  Mazrui, above n. 144, at 5. 
151  J. Fast, Beyond Bullying: Breaking the Cycle of Shame, Bullying and Violence (Oxford University Press, 2016), 
at 199. 
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undertaken in South Africa at the end of the apartheid regime as well as by 
other redress processes (including reparations paid to Jewish victims of 
Nazism, native Americans, and other groups), reflected only the loss of life 
and the value of resources looted during the period of British rule. 152 
Significantly, the scope of the debt relevant from the perspective of the 
Anthropocene narrative is not merely the resource debt or even the 
ecological degradation of the land,153 but more generally the enslavement of 
large portions of a continent to sustain a production system that has led to 
the Anthropocene. The narrow confines of environmental law or the 
measuring of environmental degradation would be utterly insufficient to 
capture this broader debt. 
3.4.3. The legal representation of future generations 
The time-horizon of the debt and associated redress mechanisms is 
particularly important in the Anthropocene narrative not only 
retrospectively (as discussed in the previous section) but also prospectively to 
the extent that our generation and the preceding ones will be leaving a more 
challenging Earth system to future generations. From a normative 
standpoint, the need to provide protection to future generations has received 
ample attention in the last decades. Of particular note is the work of Edith 
Brown Weiss on the legal dimensions of the principle of intergenerational 
equity. 154  This principle, which has been formulated in a number of 
constitutional 155  and international instruments, 156  aims to balance the 
interests of present generations with those of future generations as regards 
development and environmental protection, but it can also have a procedural 
dimension.157 																																																								
152  Idem. 
153  See Mazrui, above n. 146, at 9 (referring to the role of ecological degradation in preventing the 
socio-economic development of Africa). 
154  E. Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony and Intergenerational 
Equity (United Nations University, 1989). 
155  See J. C. Tremmel, ‘Establishing intergenerational justice in national constitutions’, in J. C. 
Tremmel (ed.), Handbook of Intergenerational Justice (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006), pp. 187-216. 
156  See C. Molinari, ‘Principle 3: From a Right to Development to Intergenerational Equity’, in J. E. 
Viñuales (ed.), The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. A Commentary (Oxford University 
Press, 2015), pp. 139-156. 
157  See e.g. Minors Oposa v. Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)(1994) 33 
ILM 173 (30 July 1993), 185 (where the Philippines Supreme Court granted jus standi to future 
generations on the basis of the principle of intergenerational equity in the Constitution of the 
Philippines); State of Himachal Pradesh and others v. Ganesh Wood Products and others, 1995 (6) SCC 363 
(where an Indian court took the principle of intergenerational equity into account in assessing the 
legality of the granting of a permit), cited in Ramlogan, R., Sustainable Development: Towards a Judicial 
Interpretation (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2011) 226. 
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A significant problem in fleshing out the protection of future generations 
is whether they are to be deemed a subject158 with its own interests and 
capacity to act (through representation) or a mere object to be directly (as 
such) or indirectly (through the protection of the environment as such) 
protected. The choice between these different approaches has important 
institutional implications, particularly as regards the degree of agency to be 
provided to future generations (as acting subjects rather than objects). A 2013 
report prepared by the UN Secretary-General 159  following a 
recommendation from the outcome document of the 2012 Rio Summit on 
Sustainable Development160 identified a number of institutional options to 
give a voice to future generations, essentially in the form of representation 
through commissioners or other agents. The report stands out, as a 
document arising from the UN bureaucracy, for the attention paid to 
theoretical questions. It devotes several pages to the theoretical foundations 
of intergenerational equity, reviewing several statements and instruments 
that acknowledge the need for some degree of solidarity with and 
representation of future generations. It then moves to a review of institutional 
developments at the international and domestic levels. 
The report reviews developments in Canada, Finland, Hungary, Israel, 
New Zealand and Wales, where specific committees, commissions or 
commissioners were established starting in the 1980s to protect the 
environment, including – sometimes explicitly – the rights of future 
generations. The first specific Commission for future generations was 
established in Israel in 2001 and the position of Commissioner was held by a 
judge, Shlomo Shoham. 161  Although the Commission was disbanded in 
2007, it is worth recalling the type of tasks that were entrusted to this 
institution. The Commission had both investigative and advisory functions. 
It could seek information from different agencies regarding the implications 
of acts and pieces of legislation for future generations and make 
recommendations to the Parliament. A more advanced institutional 
approach was later created in Hungary, where the Parliamentary 																																																								
158  See e.g. E.H.P. v. Canada, HRC Complaint no. 67/1980 (27 October 1982), para 8(a) (where the 
Human Rights Committee considered a reference made by the applicants to future generations as 
a mere way of expressing additional concern). 
159  UN Secretary-General, Intergenerational Solidarity and the Needs of Future Generations. Report of the Secretary-
General, 15 August 2013, UN Doc A/68/322. 
160  Ibid., para 86. 
161  For an assessment see S. Shoham, N. Lamay, ‘Commission for future generations in the Knesset: 
Lessons learnt’, in J. C. Tremmel (ed.), Handbook of Intergenerational Justice (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 2006), pp. 244-281. 
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Commissioner for Future Generations, Sándor Fülöp, was tasked with the 
protection of the constitutional right to a healthy environment and, to this 
effect, he could also hear individual complaints from affected citizens.162 The 
role of the Hungarian Commissioner was that of an ombudsman, although 
it also had investigative and advisory powers, including that of advocating 
legislation promoting the rights of future generations. The function was later 
subsumed under a single overall role of Commissioner for Fundamental 
Rights, but one of the Commissioner’s deputies, Marcel Szabó, kept the 
specific task of advancing the interests of future generations. A third 
illustration is provided by the Commissioner for Sustainable Futures, a 
position created by the Welsh government in 2011 and later transformed, on 
a specific statutory basis (the Well-being of Future Generations Act of 2015), 
into a Future Generations Commissioner. Unlike the previous examples, the 
Commissioners who have subsequently held these positions, Peter Davies 
and Sophie Howe, have essentially an advisory role although they can take a 
wide range of initiatives to promote sustainable development. 
At present, there have been calls for extending the representation of future 
generations through the creation of a similar ‘guardian’ position at the level 
of the European Union.163 Some of the deficiencies that such an institution 
would address include the insufficient reflection of the interests of future 
generations in the choice of discount factors within cost-benefit analysis 
assessments164 or in the policies relating to areas such as climate change or 
nuclear energy.165 
3.4.4. Present allocations: common but differentiated responsibilities 
The allocation of the benefits and burden of protecting the environment 
among present generations has been fleshed out through the concept of 
differentiation166 and a number of more specific expressions, such as the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR).167 The latter 																																																								
162  For an assessment see E. T. Ambrusné, ‘The Parliamentary Commissioner for Future Generations 
of Hungary and his impact’ (2010) 10/1 Intergenerational Justice Review 18. 
163  See M. Nesbit, A. Illés, Establishing an EU ‘Guardian for Future Generations’, Report and recommendations 
for the World Future Council (London: Institute for European Environmental Policy, 2015). 
164  Ibid., pp. 15-17. 
165  Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
166  See M. Hébié, ‘Principle 6: Special Situation of Developing Countries’, in J. E. Viñuales (ed.), The 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 207-
228. 
167  See P. Cullet, ‘Principle 7: Common but Differentiated Responsibilities’, in J. E. Viñuales (ed.), 
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 
229-244. 
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has played a prominent role in the negotiations concerning global 
environmental problems, such as climate change and biodiversity, but also 
the protection of the ozone layer or the control of persistent organic 
pollutants. Although broadly accepted as a principle, the specific implications 
of CBDR are controversial in many ways as, depending on its interpretation, 
it can result in very different allocations of responsibility. A comparison of 
how the principle has been fleshed out in three treaty contexts will help 
illustrate this point. 
The first clear (albeit implicit) expression of the principle of CBDR is the 
1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.168 
The ‘common’ and ‘differentiated’ aspects of the responsibility for the 
protection of the ozone layer are articulated through a distinction between 
core production/consumption obligations, which are common to developed 
and developing countries alike (the latter are called parties ‘operating under 
Article 5’), and the modalities of implementation, which are more lenient for 
developing countries (which are given more time to phase out the relevant 
substances and can benefit from financial and technological assistance). A 
different approach has been followed by the Kyoto Protocol to the 
UNFCCC, 169  under which only developed countries and countries in 
transition to a market economy (Annex B) have quantified emission 
reduction obligations (Article 3 and Annex B) whereas developing countries, 
including many of the main emitters of greenhouse gases, such as China, are 
not subject to any new obligations under the protocol (Article 10). This so-
called ‘Chinese wall’ between developed and developing countries reflected 
the historical emissions argument according to which developed countries, 
by virtue of their early industrialisation, have mostly caused the carbon 
budget of the troposphere to be overused.170 In such a legal architecture, the 
differentiated aspects of the CBDR principle have clearly prevailed over the 
common ones.  
However, the trends in emissions and emitters since the early 1990s have 
significantly changed, with many developing countries now appearing as the 																																																								
168  Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16 September 1987, 1522 UNTS 
29, art. 5. 
169  Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 11 December 1997, 2303 
UNTS 148.	
170  The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) under the UNFCCC 
undertook a programme to flesh out methodologically the CBDR principle (called ‘MATCH’), 
except for questions of land use change.  See N. Höhne et al, Summary report of the ad- hoc group for the 
modelling and assessment of contributions to climate change (MATCH) (2008), available at:  www.unfccc.int  
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main present and future emitters. In order to bring these countries under 
some form of mitigation discipline, the process leading to the adoption of the 
Paris Agreement on climate change in December 2015171 had to resort to a 
different way of fleshing out the CBDR principle. The key difference lies in 
the fact that, instead of focusing on a plethora of criteria or formulae for 
differentiation among States, as the mainstream literature suggested, 
differentiation was effected at the level of the very objects to be distributed 
(e.g. burden of emission reductions, financial contributions, access to 
different forms of assistance, etc.) each with its own distribution key.172 For 
mitigation, the overall system established by the Agreement is similar to all 
States and is based on unilateral declarations by each State of its own targets 
(called ‘nationally determined contribution’ or NDC) and long-term low 
carbon strategies, to be revised up at regular intervals of time (Article 4). The 
unilateral character of such declarations allows countries to specifically tailor 
the contents of such declaration to their circumstances and plans. In addition, 
developing countries are to receive financial (Article 9), technological (Article 
10) and capacity-building support (Article 11) from developed countries and 
potentially from other countries as well (e.g. emerging economies) to realise 
their targets under the Agreement. The overall system is one in which more 
leeway is granted to those countries that did not participate in the early stages 
of the Industrial Revolution and whose current developmental priorities are 
seen as a justification for a higher environmental footprint.  
The inequalities expressly consented by differentiation systems are 
important to reflect inequalities in responsibilities and impact in the past as 
well as respective capabilities. However, redressing inequalities may have 
unintended effects which are particularly clear in the climate change context 
to the extent that there are limits in the amount of greenhouse gases that may 
be emitted if the problem is to be tackled. Integrating both effectiveness and 
equity in our response to the Anthropocene challenge is a daunting enterprise 
from both a political and an operational perspective. As discussed next, law 
has an important role to play in this regard, as it can organise not only the 
																																																								
171  ‘Adoption of the Paris Agreement’, Decision 1/CP.21, 12 December 2015, FCCC/CP/2015/L.9, 
Annex (Paris Agreement). 
172  For an early exposition of this approach see J. E. Viñuales, ‘Balancing Effectiveness and Fairness 
in the Re-design of the Climate Change Regime’ (2011) 24/1 Leiden Journal of International Law 223. 
On the use of this approach in the Paris Agreement, see L. Rajamani, ‘Ambition and 
Differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: Interpretative Possibilities and Underlying Politics’ 
(2016) 65/2 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 493.  
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response but also the processes through which such a response is to be 
considered legitimate.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
LEGAL ORGANISATION OF THE TRANSITION 
 
 
 
1. Preliminary observations 
For as far as there are reliable written records, law has been widely used to 
organise and contain the consequences of the major shifts in power and 
wealth entailed by transitional processes.173 A transition of the magnitude 
required to manage our newly acquired powers with their deleterious effects 
on the Earth system will certainly entail major shifts. In point of fact, what 
we face as a species, with unequal responsibilities, is a series of transition 
processes closely but often unclearly interrelated. Whether one thinks of the 
climate-driven transition from a fossil to a low-carbon energy matrix or of 
the climate/population/pollution-driven transformation of agricultural and 
food production systems or, still, of the move from a waste disposal to a 
circular reuse system, the institutional and operational changes that will need 
to be phased-in and those that will be phased-out are of gargantuan 
dimensions.  
To situate the role of law in managing this transition, it is first necessary 
to clarify our very understanding of these processes as ‘transitions’. The use 
of the term transition in this context is not innocuous174 as it deliberately 
seeks to play down the existence of a ‘crisis’ and suggests a certain 
incrementality or progressiveness of the process rather than an abrupt 
change. In addition, the term transition conveys the idea of a ‘managed’ 
process, which in turn calls for an elucidation of both the techniques used to 
manage it and the source of legitimacy of the ‘manager’ driving and 
accompanying the process. In introducing the implications of the term 
transition as well as its deliberate and reflexive character, I will seek to lay 																																																								
173  After the restoration of democracy in Athens in 403 B.C., a complex legal system was used to 
manage the transition, particularly as regards amnesty for crimes committed during the 
dictatorship and oligarchic periods and the restitution of property. On these two points see, 
respectively : D. Cohen, ‘The rhetoric of justice: strategies of reconciliation and revenge in the 
restoration of Athenian democracy in 403 BC’ (2001) 42/2 Archives européennes de sociologie 335, at 
338; J. Elster, Closing the Books: Transition Justice in Historical Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 
2004), at 13. For a specific study of this transition see T. C. Loening, The Reconciliation Agreement of 
403/402 B.C. in Athens (Stuttgard: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1987). 
174  Bonneuil/Fressoz, above n. 1, pp. 121-122. 
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the wider humanities/social science foundations of the specific questions that 
law is capable of answering. As before, the main reason for the detour is to 
integrate the legal inquiry conducted in this essay to the much wider research 
agenda relating to the Anthropocene. 
2. The transitional narrative in energy studies 
The prevailing understanding of the evolution of energy systems holds that 
there have been phases dominated respectively by animal/human strength, 
wind and water mills, wood, coal and oil as the main energy resource, 
punctuated by phase transitions from one era to the other.175 In addition, 
starting in the 1950s and 1960s, there was some expectation that nuclear 
energy would be the next leader, although this forecast never fully 
materialised. Instead, the energy matrix remained dominated by the use of 
fossil fuels, with important additions from nuclear and hydroelectric energy 
and, much more recently, other renewable sources such as solar, wind and 
biomass (including, ironically, wood). In order to understand the implications 
of the transitional narrative, one must first look at the discourse that gradually 
introduced it. Although there is no comprehensive literature review that 
could serve as a basis for this task, some partial attempts at looking at the 
relevant data and theoretical sources have been published over time. Here, I 
will focus on one recent review, which is both comprehensive and 
balanced.176 It must also be noted that the transitional narrative appears in 
some of the main historiographical accounts of the role of energy in the 
Industrial Revolution177 as well as energy history tout court.178 After briefly 
reviewing this body of literature and, indeed, of conceptualisation of our 
understanding of energy as a social process, I will turn to the relevance of this 
debate for our more specific legal inquiry. 
The transitional narrative has been widely endorsed to make sense of 
trajectories that initially appeared as data, mostly of energy supply but, 																																																								
175  For a concise long-term account see V. Smil, ‘World History and Energy’ (2004) Encyclopedia of 
Energy vol. 1, pp. 549-561. 
176  A. Grubler, ‘Energy transitions research : Insights and cautionary tales’ (2012) 50 Energy Policy 8. 
177  D.S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus. Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe 
from 1750 to the Present (Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn 2003 [1969]) (Landes characterises the 
Industrial Revolution as a succession of technological changes, particularly the rise of the steam 
engine, but also new forms of industrial organisation, particularly the ‘factory system’). 
178  V. Smil, Energy in World History (Boulder CO : Westview Press, 1994) (Smil’s study is a major effort 
to defeat deterministic accounts of energy’s role in world history. He considers critically the 
tendancy of such grand accounts of energy and human history to identify energy eras and energy 
transitions. His analysis highlights, however, the dominant role of such accounts in understanding 
the history of energy use). 
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increasingly, also of energy demand (end use). In other words, and perhaps 
unsurprisingly, statistical energy data came first and interpretation and 
theory, in the form of transitional theories, came later.179 In curves depicting 
the relative share of each energy source over time (i.e. the percentage of each 
source in the overall energy matrix180), changes from one source to the other 
appear as transitions. Moreover, for early adopters, the rise of new energy 
sources was a long and slow process spanning, for the modern transitions, 
approximately 130 years (for the phasing in of coal and steam power in the 
Industrial Revolution) and 80 years (for the phasing in of oil, gas and 
electricity).181 There is a body of literature suggesting that for late adopters 
(countries, political units, companies, etc.) the pace of the transition can be 
much faster as it relies on the experience gained by early adopters.182 A. 
Grubler summarises this point, by reference to the phasing in and out of coal 
and steam, with the simple expression ‘first in, last out; last in, first out’.183 
Thus, the UK and Germany were early adopters of coal and steam (as 
compared to late adopters such as Italy and Sweden) and they phased out 
this energy matrix later than late adopters.184 Another important way in 
which this literature relies on the concept of transitions is by identifying 
sequential stages in the development and diffusion of energy technologies, 
starting with a long but critical period of experimentation and learning at the 
technology units level (e.g. engine, turbine, nuclear reactor, solar panel), 
which are then scaled up in order to benefit from economies of scale (e.g. 																																																								
179  Grubler, above n. 176, at 9 (referring to some pioneering efforts to gather and refine data on energy 
at the international level – from P. C. Putnam, Energy in the Future (New York: Van Nostrand, 1953) 
to A. Kander et al, Power to the People. Energy in Europe over the Last Five Centuries (Princeton NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2012) - or at the domestic level – e.g. S.H. Schurr, B.C. Netschert, 
Energy in the American Economy 1850-1975 (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1960) or R. Fouquet, 
P.J.G. Pearson, ‘A thousand years of energy use in the United Kingdom’ (1998) 19/4 The Energy 
Journal 1). 
180  Bonneuil and Fressoz rightly caution against conflating this relative measure of the role of a given 
energy source (e.g. coal accounting for more than 60% of the energy sources used at time 1) with 
absolute measures (e.g. if the energy consumption at time 2 is three times as large as that at time 
1, even if coal accounts for 30% of the new energy matrix, much more coal is being consumed in 
absolute terms at time 2 than at time 1). They hold this confusion as a major problem presented 
by accounts of energy transitions, which, in their view, obscure the levels of overall consumption. 
See Bonneuil/Fressoz, above n. 1. 
181  Grubler, above n. 176, pp. 11-12. 
182  See M. Frankel, ‘Obsolescence and technological change in a maturing economy’ (1955) 45(3) 
American Economic Review 296 ; A. Grubler, ‘Time for a change : On the patterns of diffusion of 
innovation’ (1996) 125/3 Daedalus 19 ; B. Gales et al, ‘North versus south: energy transitions and 
energy intensity in Europe over 200 years’ (2006) 11/2 European Review of Economic History 219; C. 
Wilson, Meta-analysis of Unit and Industry Level Scaling Dynamics in Energy Technologies and Climate Change 
Mitigation Scenarios, IR-09-029 (Laxenburg: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 
2009). 
183  Grubler, above n. 176, at 12.  
184  Ibid., at 13 (figure 2). 
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larger units), which subsequently turn into a major industry servicing core 
markets and, eventually, move from core markets to other (rim and 
peripheral) markets through trade and investment.185 Significantly, this body 
of research suggests that the stages in the up-scaling process are sequential 
and not simultaneous, which further anchors the idea of transitional 
processes. 
Moreover, a combination of empirical studies and more specific 
theoretical models186 suggests that the role of policy in the emergence and, 
even more, the refinement and diffusion of technologies is of particular 
importance. For present purposes, three insights must be highlighted. Firstly, 
as already mentioned, empirical studies show that the initial phase of 
emergence, experimentation and refinement is critical for the up-scaling of 
new technologies.187 Secondly, also from an empirical perspective, it has 
been widely shown that new technologies have to face ‘socio-technical 
regimes’ that are deeply grounded (both in terms of sunk investments but also 
rules – laws – and power relations) on existing technologies.188 Thirdly, the 
up-scaling and diffusion process is a competitive and often confrontational 
one where the established participants in the regime incur higher costs 
(scrapping infrastructure and investment) and potentially decline in moving 
into a new socio-technical regime (as suggested by the ‘first in, last out’ 
insight), and they are likely to use the means at their disposal to prevent the 
change or at least to make it less costly and gain time. Such trade-offs between 
industries also involve trade-offs between individuals (e.g. workers in the old 
model may lose their jobs) and countries (e.g. countries deeply invested in the 
old technology may lose ground to new entrants) and, above all, values (e.g. 
reducing unemployment and offering cheap electricity versus protecting 
health from air pollution or mitigating climate change). For example, fighting 
climate change may entail for some emerging economies the need to move 
massively into renewable energy generation. From the perspective of energy 
transition theory, such a move by latecomers makes much sense as it entails 
lower levels of investment scrapping and can accelerate the adoption of the 																																																								
185  Ibid., at 14 (discussing the work of C. Wilson, above n. 182). 
186  F. Geels, ‘The multi-level perspective in sustainability transitions: Response to seven criticisms’ 
(2011) 1 Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 24 (discussing and addressing recurrent 
criticisms of the multi-level perspective (MLP) of socio-technical transitions and offering a useful 
literature review). 
187  See Wilson, above n. 182. 
188  Geels, above n. 186, at 27-28 (characterizing the concept and referring to the literature on 
applications of the MLP to transitions of electricity systems, transportation systems or biogas, 
among others). 
J. E. Viñuales  In Our Hands? 
_________________________________________________________________________________	
	 65 
new technology, with the ensuing mitigation effects benefitting all countries. 
However, it also challenges an established regime (entrenched, among 
others, in international trade, investment and intellectual property rules) with 
its own beneficiaries. As discussed next, these three aspects of transitions are 
of particular relevance from a legal perspective. 
3. Law and sustainability transitions 
3.1. Overview 
As discussed in the preceding section, technological transitions and, more 
generally, sustainability transitions call for policy (and hence legal) change. 
When such policy changes are attempted or introduced, different legal means 
may be used to either promote (new patents, environmental regulation, 
health regulation, investment law, trade law) or to hinder (patent 
infringement litigation, investment law, trade law) such developments. In 
addition, beyond the pragmatic aspects of promoting/hindering change, law 
plays a critical role in offering avenues to legitimising change. 
These three aspects of the legal organisation of transitions, namely the 
legal form of policy changes, the legal means to promote or hinder such 
changes, and the wider legal frameworks capable of legitimising them, all call 
for further elucidation. As in previous sections, the field is too vast to be 
covered even superficially within the confines of this essay. My purpose is 
only to frame the broad legal questions that would have to be addressed and, 
when possible, to discuss the most relevant legal literature. To better 
understand the nature of these three inquiries, it may be useful to recall a 
distinction made by A. Supiot in the context of his critique of labour law,189 
namely that between a conception of norms and regulation as technical fine-
tuning or optimisation, and another conception according to which norms 
express moral choices.   
The first inquiry discussed next (3.2) is clearly based on the optimisation 
conception, where law is seen as a technology conveying pre-determined 
scientific truths (rather than fundamental normative choices) and, as a result, 
the objective of legal research is to make the instrument (law and regulation) 
fit for purpose. At the other end, the third inquiry (3.4) is based on the 
assumption that social choices cannot be fully pre-determined by scientific 
truths and, therefore, an explicit normative or value choice is an 																																																								
189  Supiot, above n. 91, pp. X-XIII. 
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indispensable and unavoidable step in policy- and decision-making. The fact 
that law may be mostly, but never entirely, the expression of one of these two 
conceptions is well illustrated by the second aforementioned inquiry, namely 
that focusing on how law may promote or hinder policy change (3.3).  
3.2. Adaptive legal systems 
Law, when considered as a regulative instrument, becomes a technology that 
can be fine-tuned and optimised to reach a stated purpose. Some of the work 
that has been done to explore the role of law in the Anthropocene follows 
this perspective and argues in favour of a regulatory paradigm where law 
would become an ‘adaptive system’.190 
In a collection of works edited by A. S. Garmestani and C. R. Allen, 
several case-studies relating to wildlife and biodiversity protection, natural 
preserves, marine protected areas, water governance and climate change are 
discussed from the perspective of socio-ecological resilience, characterised as 
a change within the system rather than of the system (regime change).191 The 
goal of the book is to contribute to the design of legal systems that are capable 
of remaining relevant (regulative) even in cases of regime change. As 
discussed previously in this essay, the wide assumption on which law making 
processes are based is that nature does not fundamentally change or, as the 
contributors to this book note, that ‘the environment, ecosystems, and 
natural resources are presumed to exist in a particular condition or state’.192 
Once that state is defined, the conventional approach to environmental 
regulation is to introduce a legal framework to keep the system in that state, 
for example, by limiting extraneous inputs or interference (e.g. pollutants) 
within limits that allow the system to return to its equilibrium. However, 
socio-ecological systems cannot be conceptualised as having a single 
equilibrium. Rather, there is substantial evidence suggesting that ecosystems 
can exist in a variety of stable states. In order to adapt to the constant change 
in socio-ecological systems, laws and regulations must be managed as 
adaptive systems that try different types of interventions on the basis of 
different understandings of a problem and adjust accordingly as the results 
of such interventions are known. The authors acknowledge the need for law 																																																								
190  See Garmestani/Allen, above n. 14 ; Baker, above n. 16. 
191  Garmestani/Allen, above n. 14, at 6 (defining socio-ecological resilience as ‘the amount of 
disturbance a linked socio-ecological system can absorb before reorganizing into a state 
characterized by a different set of processes and structures’) 
192  Ibid., at 2. 
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to provide a certain degree of certainty, hence of rigidity, and the ability of 
law to adapt to changing human values, but they argue that such an 
approach to regulation remains inadequate for ecological processes and 
features: 
‘The maladaptive nature of law can allow, facilitate, or even mandate pathological choices 
and behaviors with respect to ecosystems. It can contribute to incidents of ecological 
collapse, which in turn lead to incidents of social collapse’193 
Different legal techniques inspired on adaptive management (e.g. more 
flexible legal interventions capable of being adjusted on the basis of the 
feedback received through monitoring of its impact) could be used to fine-
tune legal systems, and the contributors to the volume discuss some of them 
with emphasis on the administrative and environmental law of the United 
States.  
The detail of these techniques is less important for present purposes than 
the overall approach expounded by the editors and contributors of the book, 
which is genuinely regulative in that it seeks to optimise the ability of legal 
systems with respect to socio-ecological processes. Degradation of ecological 
processes can indeed lead to collapse of social processes, but excessive 
protection of the environment may also have adverse social effects. The great 
uncertainties entailed by these complex interactions hence call for a constant 
adjustment and fine-tuning of the regulatory system. Interestingly, the 
process of fine-tuning seeks some form of scientific optimality but it displays 
limited sensitivity to other features of real life, such as the dynamics of socio-
technical transitions, politics, vested interests, and also the need for legal 
certainty or of a strong signal to guide new investment, with which law must 
also cope. More fundamentally, this approach focuses on the legal 
frameworks facing environmental problems or, in other words, those 
addressing externalities, and it tends to overemphasise the rigidity of such 
frameworks. What is missing is a much broader understanding of legal 
concepts whereby it is not only the protective or regulative system that is fine-
tuned but also the organisation of the transactions that cause the negative 
externalities (e.g. the legal form of business organisations) and even the 
foundational legal categories structuring such systems (e.g. causality in the 
attribution of liability for environmental harm). Even if law is envisaged 
mostly as a technology, the underpinnings of the technology are much 
																																																								
193  Ibid., at 5. 
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broader than the sole environmental law or the laws dealing directly with 
environmental problems. 
3.3. Promoting or hindering the transition 
Law plays a major role in signalling and prompting or, conversely, 
preventing social change. The analysis of sustainability transitions cannot 
overlook this dimension. Yet, technology-focused models rarely pay any 
attention to the legal form of recommended policy interventions,194 even 
when they explicitly aim to cover rules and institutions.195 This is problematic 
because legal form does matter, as can be illustrated from a current example.  
The recent conclusion of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change196 was 
largely facilitated by an initial understanding between the two main emitters 
of greenhouse gases, China and the United States. A key part of this 
understanding was the effort of the US administration to regulate emissions 
from power plants through the so-called ‘Clean Power Plan’ (CPP), a 
regulation from the US Environmental Protection Agency, published in late 
2015.197 The adoption of a concrete measure to tackle its main source of 
emissions made the US’ commitment to a climate deal credible to the eyes of 
both China and the rest of the world. However, such action rests on 
potentially fragile legal grounds. Although the Obama administration 
initially sought to have a specific Act (the ‘Clean Energy and Security Act’ or 
‘Waxman-Markey Bill’) passed through the US Congress, that option was 
not politically viable due to opposition in the Senate. The administration 
then turned to another avenue, a legal enabler, namely using the authority 
already delegated by Congress to it in a piece of legislation several decades 
old, the Clean Air Act (CAA), which authorises regulation to fight air 
pollution.198  Through an earlier reinterpretation of the CAA to include 
carbon dioxide among air pollutants,199 this delegation made legally possible 																																																								
194  New and more realistic modeling approaches may be capable of addressing this deficiency, see J.-
F. Mercure et al, 'Modelling complex systems of heterogeneous agents to better design 
sustainability transitions policy', (2016) 37 Global Environmental Change 102. 
195  As in the case of the multi-level perspective of socio-technical transitions discussed in Geel, above 
n. 186. 
196  See above n. 171. 
197  Environmental Protection Agency, Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (October 23, 2015). From the 
perspective of China, a change of development model greatly contributed to setting new priorities 
in international climate negotiations. See I. Hilton, O. Kerr, ‘The Paris Agreement: China’s ‘New 
Normal’ Role in International Climate Negotiations’ (2017) 17 Climate Policy 48. 
198  Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §7401 et seq. (1970). 
199  Massachusetts v. EPA 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
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the adoption of the CPP. What to a non-lawyer may look like a hardly 
noticeable difference in legal form is, in practice, very important for the 
prospects of the CPP and, accordingly, for those of the meaningful 
participation of the US in the Paris Agreement. This became manifest when 
in early February 2016 the US Supreme Court suspended the 
implementation of the CPP following legal action from a group of affected 
federated States and companies.200 The challenge of the CPP provides a 
textbook illustration of how the stakeholders that are more involved in the 
current socio-technical regime and that, as a result, would lose more from a 
regime change can use legal means to hinder a sustainability transition or, at 
least, to gain time. That threat became more realistic after the election to the 
Presidency, in late 2016, of climate-hostile Republican candidate. But the 
prospects for such an outcome had been foreseen by the previous 
administration and the text of the Paris Agreement itself was legally 
engineered to make it more difficult to repeal or defeat. Addressing the 
technicalities of this approach is less important here201 than the broader point 
that legal form of the transitional process is not without significant and 
potentially major consequences.  
A similar analysis can be conducted in connection with the resilience of 
the energy transition policies (e.g. feed-in-tariff schemes) adopted by 
countries around the world, from Canada, to Spain, the Czech Republic or 
India, when assessed from the standpoint of international trade and 
investment law. Such policies are key to send a signal to the private sector to 
invest resources in the development and diffusion of technologies (from 
renewable energy equipment or generation to electric vehicles or efficient 
batteries). Law can create new markets and opportunities, and thereby it can 
promote a technological transition.202 However, depending on the specific 
legal form of an energy policy intervention (e.g. whether the instrument has 
been adopted following due process standards, or is more or less 
proportional, or whether it subjects foreign and domestic producers and 
investors to different treatment), its legal resilience will not be the same, 
because it may be challenged before an international trade or investment 
tribunal.203 Yet, it is sometimes the case, as for the CPP, that the features 																																																								
200  Order in pending case, West Virginia et al v. EPA et al (February 9, 2016), 577 U.S. 
201  See D. Wirth, ‘ Cracking the American Climate Negotiators’ Hidden Code: United States Law 
and the Paris Agreement’ (2016) 6 Climate Law 152. 
202  See e.g. Jorge E. Viñuales, Green Industrial Policy and Trade : A Tool-Box (Geneva : PAGE, 2017). 
203  See Jorge E. Viñuales, Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 2012, reprint 2015). 
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challenged are precisely the legal enablers necessary to make the adoption of 
the instrument politically possible. 
A good illustration is provided by the subsidies scheme introduced by 
India to support local producers of renewable energy (solar) equipment. To 
understand the deeper implications of this case, it is useful to recall some 
conclusions of the literature on socio-technical transitions discussed earlier. 
One important aspect was the ‘first in, last out; last in, first out’ insight. 
Applied to China, South Korea, India and other emerging economies, this 
means that the cost of moving away from a given socio-technical regime and 
into a new one is lower for such a country, because it is less tied to the 
previous regime. In fact, embracing the new technology may provide a 
competitive advantage if and when the new socio-technical regime (based on 
a low-carbon energy matrix) becomes dominant. From a political 
perspective, it is then reasonable to expect that India will move in the 
direction of the new socio-technical regime not only because there are global 
benefits relating to climate change mitigation but also because, by doing so, 
it may give its industry an opportunity to position itself in the emerging socio-
technical regime. This is precisely what the Indian renewable energy support 
scheme (India Solar Mission) tried to achieve by including local content (‘buy 
local’) requirements. In order to participate in the government electricity 
purchase programme introduced by India, a producer of electricity from 
renewable sources had to source its equipment from Indian producers. Such 
a measure is normally illegal under both international trade and investment 
disciplines and, following legal action from the US and others, a trade panel 
constituted under the aegis of the WTO found India in breach of its 
international trade obligations.204  
Underlying this ruling – and the trade rules on which it is based – is the 
idea that trade must be liberalised to promote efficiency based on 
comparative advantage reasoning. If a foreign producer of solar energy 
equipment abroad is more efficient (it produces and sells at a lower price) 
than an Indian one, then its advantage must not be neutralised by 
governmental interference (protectionism). However, the operation of the 
rules can also be assessed in a different light. The overall operation of trade 
rules could be seen as a hindrance to an energy transition in one of the two 
most populated countries of the world. To the extent that for a country such 																																																								
204  India — Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, Report of the Panel, 24 April 2016, 
WT/DS456/R. 
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as India it is not realistic to move massively into renewable energy if that 
amounts to subsidise foreign producers of renewable energy equipment, 
rather than local ones, then the question is whether we are serious in our 
constant efforts (including complex and costly climate change negotiations) 
to push emerging economies into a low carbon energy matrix. It may be 
theoretically possible to ask such countries to both move into renewables and 
buy foreign products, as trade law seems to require, but it is hardly realistic 
and, even if they could be nudged in that direction, it is not necessarily fair. 
It may be useful to recall here the discussion earlier in this essay regarding 
global exchange systems, and the protectionist position taken by developed 
countries at the stage when they were developing new industries and 
technologies. Irrespective of the policy (and political) stance one may take on 
this question, the relevance of law and legal form in promoting or hindering 
sustainability transitions can hardly be questioned. As for the deeper 
normative question of the values that should be advanced by legal 
frameworks, this is also an area where law can play a key role. 
3.4. Legitimising the transition 
A different conception of law underpins discussions of its role in providing 
legitimacy. I should begin by clarifying how I see the role of law as a 
legitimacy provider in this context. First, law can provide legitimacy by 
fleshing out certain policy interventions in such a way as to achieve a better 
result defined by reference to some pre-set goals (results-based legitimacy). 
Such is the case of the regulative conception of law as a pure technology, 
discussed earlier. The higher legitimacy of law comes in this case from the 
fact that it is better designed to achieve certain goals arising from a prior 
value choice. This is not what I have in mind here. Instead, I would like to 
discuss the role of law in legitimising the transition from two other 
perspectives. In one of these perspectives, law provides legitimacy because it 
enshrines certain pre-selected legal values. The difference with the previous 
approach is that the legitimacy provided by law rests on the sole consecration 
of the value and not in the capacity of law to optimise it. It is a deontological 
rather than a consequentialist logic. In the third perspective, law provides 
legitimacy not because it enshrines the values to be protected but because it 
organises a process that is expected to lead to the consecration of such end-
values. To some extent, this perspective can be seen as a use of the first 
perspective to reach the second one. What is designed here is an appropriate 
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process capable of leading to foundational – non-instrumental – values while 
respecting certain others – instrumental values. The latter point is important. 
Indeed, the design of the process parameters is not value-free. It rests on 
certain values (of what a proper process is expected to be) but such values are 
instrumental, their enshrinement in law is valued by reference to the ability 
to lead to the consecration of other – non-instrumental – values envisioned 
in the second perspective.  I would like to illustrate how the second and third 
perspectives could illuminate the role of law in legitimising sustainability 
transitions.  
From the second perspective, a fundamental legitimising role played by law is 
to translate into a consecrated or instituted form (even when such institution 
consists of an understanding of what customary or ‘common’ law is) some 
foundational values of a community, particularly certain rights and 
guarantees enshrined in a constitution. Much like the standard ethical 
systems discussed by Hans Jonas, 205  modern constitutional systems are 
broadly based on a human anthropology and an understanding of human 
agency that is challenged by the Anthropocene narrative. The modern 
conceptions of liberty and equality and the articulation between these two 
fundamental values are based on a culture of ‘individualism’, ‘dignity’ and 
‘progress’, understood as the human ability to increasingly push back natural 
constraints, as well as of emancipation through freedom from nature and 
prosperity (development and growth) with no lasting impact on nature. 
Several significant contributions have been made to highlight the 
anthropocentric underpinnings of modern constitutions as well as to 
reformulate constitutionalism from an environmental perspective.206 In an 
important contribution, Louis Kotzé has investigated the implications of the 																																																								
205  See above n. 57. 
206  See particularly, in the German constitutional scholarship, the works of R. Steinberg, Der ökologische 
Verfassungsstaat (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988) (relying on the earlier work of M. Kloepfer, 
who saw the environment as an intrinsic element for the existence of the State, now reinterpreted 
as ‘Umweltstaat’, Steinberg argues for a ‘ecological constitutional State’ in which protection of the 
environment is both instrumental (anthropocentric) and an end in itself); K. Bosselmann, Im Namen 
der Natur: Der Weg zum ökologischen Rechtsstaat (Bern: Scherz, 1992) (introducing the conception of an 
ecological rule of law, which seeks to depart from the overwhelmingly human-centred conception 
of modern constitutions, with its focus on human development as pushing the limits of – indeed, 
destroying – nature). In North-American constitutional scholarship the contributions follow a more 
empirical and comparative approach (see e.g. D. R. Boyd , The Environmental Rights Revolution: A 
Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights, and the Environment (Vancouver: UBC Press , 2012) and J. 
R. May, E. Daly, Global Environmental Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press, 2014)) although 
there have been major contributions to the reformulation of foundational legal categories (a classic 
example is C. Stone, ‘Should Trees have Standing? Towards Legal Rights for Natural Objects’ 
(1972) 45 California Law Review 450.  Louis Kotzé provides a lucid account of these and other 
contributions in Kotzé, above n. 14, pp. 136-151. 
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Anthropocene narrative for the understanding of constitutional law in a 
comparative and international perspective.207 Relying on previous work on 
environmental constitutionalism, he explains that constitutional intervention 
for environmental protection is the most effective – because the most 
fundamental – form of legal intervention. At the constitutional level, the 
relations between humans and nature can be genuinely redefined from a 
normative perspective, much in the same way as – in his experience as a 
South African – constitutional law has been able to structure South Africa’s 
transition out the apartheid regime. He then reviews different ways in which 
the main dimensions of constitutionalism, including the rule of law, 
separation of powers, judicial review, constitutional supremacy, democratic 
rule and constitutional rights, could be revisited from an environmental 
protection perspective. Despite the significant effort displayed in this 
account, its fundamental premise seems to remain that an environmental 
reformulation of constitutional law, and its possible generalisation at the 
international level, are the best legal means to rise to the unprecedented 
challenge posed by the Anthropocene. As noted by Kotzé: 
‘The central hypothesis of this book is that ‘ordinary’ non-constitutional law, while crucial 
to mediating the human-environment interface, will not be sufficient to do so on its own in 
the Anthropocene. A form of constitutional law, most clearly explicated by environmental 
constitutionalism, is required to confront Anthropocene exigencies because of the social, 
political, juridical and regulatory advantages that constitutionalism holds out over ‘ordinary’ 
non-constitutional law.’208 
If this proposition means that ‘environmental law’ alone or, more specifically, 
‘ordinary’ environmental law will not be sufficient to rise to the challenge, 
one can only agree. But I am less certain that an environmental re-
interpretation or even re-design of constitutional law is the most far-reaching 
step that can be made from a legal perspective.  
As I have endeavoured to show throughout this essay, there are myriad 
ways in which law has over the last two centuries prompted and sustained 
the advent of the Anthropocene, and they may all be engaged in attempting 
to manage the new proposed geological epoch. Changing the top of the 
pyramid would certainly be a major step. But what exactly is to be considered 
the top of the normative pyramid? Is it the constitution, understood from a 
top-down hierarchical perspective of law? Is it the bottom-up law of an 
inverted pyramid that governs commercial transactions, payments, property, 																																																								
207  Kotzé, above n. 14. 
208  Ibid., at 177. 
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labour, business organisation, and many other areas of human activity? Is it 
the international legal frameworks organising broad international flows of 
goods, services, capitals, people, waste, resources, knowledge or culture? Is it 
the very legal concepts pervading European-rooted legal discourse, whether 
constitutional or other, which carry a dominating and unsustainable 
ontology of human relations to nature? Is it all of this as well as the other 
ways in which law influences human behaviour at once? My view is that, at 
least from a methodological perspective, we must take the time to revisit all 
these different dimensions and understand their role in prompting and 
sustaining the Anthropocene. That is, I believe, a necessary first step. But the 
more we include, the higher the need for a meaningfully structured inquiry 
identifying a limited set of questions that relate to the inquiries conducted in 
other disciplines, whether in the humanities, social or natural sciences.  
Constitutions may be, however, strategically important from the third 
perspective identified earlier, namely for the organisation of the processes 
through which value choices are enshrined into law, whether to amend the 
constitution or to reorganise labour or corporate law or even to create new 
subjects of law or redefine liability and causality. Thus, whatever the real 
location of the top of the pyramid – to continue with the observation made 
in the previous paragraph – law can provide legitimacy to the evolving value 
choices made and enshrined into law by organising processes that guide and 
regulate such choice processes. In political philosophy, this approach is 
commonly known as ‘procedural justice’, 209  whereby the value of the 
outcome comes from the process that is followed to reach it or, more 
specifically, from the respect of instrumental values underpinning the 
organisation of that very process. As an illustration of how law could provide 
legitimacy in such a context one could refer to the ‘organic’ part of most 
constitutions (which defines how the community is organised, the institutions 
and their powers and inter-relations) and, more specifically, to the rise in the 
last two decades of so-called procedural environmental rights granting 
individuals enhanced control powers over the environmental implications of 
production and consumption process: powers to know and to act directly 
(right of access to environmental information, right of participation in 
																																																								
209  For a foundational discussion see J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1971, revised in 1999), section 14.  
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environmental decision-making, and access to justice).210 This is, in my view, 
a strategically important way in which law can provide legitimacy to the 
choices driving a transition to sustainability: by organising processes – based 
on instrument values (organic parts in constitutions based on direct, semi-
direct or representative democratic institutions or on a triad of 
environmental procedural rights) – that can lead to foundational societal 
choices. 
 
 
  
																																																								
210  On this rise see J. Ebbesson, ‘Principle 10 : Public Participation’, in  J. E. Viñuales (ed.), The Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development. A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 287-
310. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
A RESEARCH AGENDA 
 
 
 
The purpose of this last section is to pull all the threads unwound in the 
previous pages in order to provide a concise and hopefully meaningful 
agenda to guide legal research on the different dimensions of the 
Anthropocene. Importantly, the proposed agenda must be capable of 
integrating legal inquiry into the broader interdisciplinary efforts aimed at 
understanding the Anthropocene. For this reason, each of the three previous 
sections started with a detour or, in other words, a reference to the wider 
debate in the humanities, social and natural sciences, which provide both the 
foundations and the connection with the legal research agenda developed 
here. Within these broader questions, the proposed agenda must identify 
questions that are apposite for legal inquiry, i.e. questions for which legal 
inquiry is capable of providing relevant answers that cannot be provided by 
other disciplines. Finally, the agenda must both select an appropriate set of 
legal questions of sufficient generality and organise them into an overall 
coherent framework.  
Based on these considerations, I would like to offer the following research 
agenda aimed at understanding the role of law in prompting, sustaining and 
potentially managing the Anthropocene: 
 
1. Ontological dualism  
1.1. Broader inquiry: 
The Anthropocene narrative challenges the widely held assumption that human progress consisted of pushing 
natural frontiers and constraints, within a natural theatre deemed to be immutable in a human timeframe. 
Such frontiers were seen as less and less relevant to the understanding of human activity as science and 
technology – hence human powers over nature – progressed. Instead, the Anthropocene narrative suggests that 
human and natural histories are intertwined, even within a short – human – timeframe, because what was 
believed to be progress with no adverse impact on the ability of the Earth system to regenerate is in fact 
modifying major geological cycles to such an extent that humans are a geological force whose impact on the 
Earth will be felt both in natural cycles and by humans themselves. 
1.2. Within this broader inquiry a cluster of legal questions can be identified regarding: 
i) The extent to which and the processes whereby law and legal concepts have been detached from nature, 
and the implications for the advent, sustaining and potential management of the Anthropocene; 
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ii) The extent to which law and legal concepts can express the unprecedented level of responsibility of 
humans as a geological force driving the Anthropocene; 
iii) The extent to which legal orders can be adjusted through additional layers of norms – such as 
environmental law – or, instead, require a deeper reformulation of foundational concepts, with the 
ensuing imbrications of such reformulations, to address the challenges of the Anthropocene. 
2. Inequalities 
2.1. Broader inquiry:  
Stating that ‘humans’ are the geological force behind the Anthropocene conceals profound intra-species 
inequalities between regions and groups of people in prompting, sustaining or suffering from the unsettling of 
natural cycles unveiled by the Anthropocene narrative. Understanding such inequalities is important both for 
allocating responsibilities and for addressing the social dynamics that prompted and sustained the Anthropocene 
and that will in all likelihood affect some groups more than others.  
2.2. Within this broader inquiry a cluster of legal questions can be identified regarding: 
i) The relation between a certain legal organisation of production – including the law governing business 
organisation, labour relations, and effects on third parties – and the inequalities underpinning the 
Anthropocene; 
ii) The relation between the law governing exchange systems at the internal (including imperial) or 
international (bilateral, regional, global) levels and the processes prompting and sustaining the 
Anthropocene; 
iii) How law can be used to allocate responsibilities for the past, present and future adverse impacts unveiled 
by the Anthropocene narrative among past, present and future groups of people. 
3. Transitions 
3.1. Broader inquiry:  
Given the role of energy, transportation, agriculture and other foundational activities in prompting and 
sustaining the Anthropocene, it is necessary to understand the dynamics of transitions to other socio-technical 
regimes, including the emergence of pioneering technologies, the necessary period for their refinement and 
diffusion, the many resistances from prior entrenched interests and, more generally, the many trade-offs entailed 
by the transition. 
3.2. Within this broader inquiry a cluster of legal questions can be identified regarding: 
i) The ways to improve law and regulation as a technology to address the challenges of the Anthropocene; 
ii) The ways in which law can promote or, conversely, hinder attempts to transition from one unsustainable 
socio-technical regime to a sustainable one; 
iii) The legal ways of reflecting value choices or of organising processes to legitimise the choices entailed by 
such a transition. 
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